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INTRODUCTION 
My thesis describes those salt doJTEs of the Gulf Coast Region which 
contain comITErcial sulphur deposits, as well as the associated Frasch sulphur 
industry. The origin, structure, and COfll'OSition of the Gulf Coast salt 
domes is first discussed. A generous portion of this discussion is devoted 
to the cap rock where the sulphur is deposited. A profile of the nature of 
sulphur is then undertaken, followed by a description of Herman Frasch, his 
process, and the developITEnt of the Frasch sulph ur industry up to the present. 
Predictions for the future of the industry, and a final summary of the ,: 
industry's developJTEtit conclude the paper. 
i 
1 
SALT BASIN ORIGIN 
Frasch sulphur is mined from the cap rocks overlying salt dome structures 
found most extensively in the Gulf Coast Region of North America. There 
are also recently developed Frasch operations in Poland and the Soviet Union. 
An explanation of the origin of the salt basin, salt dome structures, and their 
cap rock is necessary background for the understanding of the occurrence of 
sulphur in these structures. 
A salt basin is the result of an evaporative process performed on marine 
water. This process results in an evaporite depositional sequence. The 
evaporite sequence is characterized by the precipitation of the least soluble 
compounds first ((calcium carbonate- limestone) and ~alcium sulphate-gypsum 
and anhydrite)) followed by the precipitation of the more soluble salts 
(halite (NaCl) and then potassium and magnesium salts). Pettijohn stated 
that in a 1,000 foot column of present day seawater a total of fifteen feet 
of evaporite will be precipitated from this solution. This evaporite is 
composed of 0.4 feet of calcium sulphate, 11.6 feet of halite, and 3.0 feet 
of the lighter element salts. 1 In nature all or just part of this sequence 
can be found,and its occurrence depends upon brine concentration, temperature, 
and solubility of the salts in brine. The final variables affecting the 
deposition of evaporites are depth of water, bathymetry of the basin, time 
of evaporation and geomorphological characteristics of adjacent land bodies. 2 
These variables are integrated into Ochsenius' "bar theory" for the 
deposition of evaporites. Thick sequences are formed in basins where 
evaporation defeats rainfall and surface run-off, and marine waters are 
restricted from supplying the evaporite pool · with fresh unconcentrated 
s:olution due to some sort of barrier. Replenishment, with unconcentrated 
solution to the basin, occurs only when stonn flood waters ascend over the 
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basin's seaward barrier. These events take place over an extensive span of 
geologic time. 3 
The salt basin underlying the Gulf Region of East Texas and Louisiana, 
and from which the Region's salt dome structures extend into the overlying 
basin sediments is named the Louann salt. The Louann salt is considered to 
be either Pennian in age or to range from Triassic to Middle Jurassic in age. 
There is substantial evidence provided for each of these hypotheses . 
The belief that the Louann salt is Permian in age is the older of the 
two hypotheses. 4 General evidence supportingthis hypothesy beqins v!ith the 
consideration of the period's climate. The Pennian 11Jas a period of 
extreme aridity which prevailed for a great length of time. There are Permian 
evaporite sequences distributed across the globe. Several of these display 
great accumulations of salt similar to the Louann. A particularly analagous 
salt basin is the Zechstein Salt of northern Gennany which has an extensive 
area of salt dome structures extending from the Zechstei n "mother bed" of 
salt. The West Texas Permian salt basin lends credence to the speculated 
Permian age of the Louann due to its proximity to the Gulf area. 
Development of the Louann is chiefly believed to have evolved from 
interconnecting barred basins according to Branson's model (1915). 5 The 
carbonates and sulphates are first precipitated in one barred basin, after 
which the marine waters flow to the neighboring barred basin where the 
hypersaline salts are precipitated. 
The deposition of the Louann salt basin originated because of hypersaline 
waters flowing in from the west. 6 The source of these waters was the 
Castile Sea situated in the Delaware basin in what is now west Texas. The 
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Castile fonnation was deposited in this basin in the form of calcium sulphate 
(anhydrite) and calcium carbonate (limestone). These su lphates and carbonates 
were deposited until the water ' s concentration approached the point of NaCl 
precipitation. An influx of marine water would flood over the bar barrier 
at the south area of the Delaware Basin supplied by a shallow marine sea in 
the south and the southwest. These marine waters dri ven by storm action 
arrived with sufficient force to displace the hypersaline waters into the east . 
The hypersaline waters probably flowed' along a southeast t rending channel to 
the south of Texas• Central Mining Region. They reached t he Louann-Werner 
Basin (Gulf Coast Basin) and were then evaporated leaving behind sodium 
chloride salt. 
Two more stratigraphic features help in supporting this model. 7 An 
unconfonnity at the base of the Werner Formation correl ates with an uncon-
formity at the base of the Castile Fonnation. A hiatus between the Louann 
salt and Norphelt Fonnation represents post Castile Pennian time, all of 
Triassic, and Lower and Middle Jurassic time. It is suspected that the 
channel was pennanently closed prior to Salado time (Hazzard et al., 1947). 
Halbouty and Hardin (1 956 ) expanded on Hazzard's work. Their model 
first described the Gulf sa lt basin area to have subsided with the extensi ve 
Llanoria landmass of the Ouachita tectonic province. This was the beginning 
of the Gulf coast geosyncline and the present day Gulf of Mexico. The 
subsidence continued through the Lower and Middle Permian time and fanned a 
large restricted basin. 8 
The seas of west Texas, due to the arid climate, were al so restricted, 
and the Delaware basin was the only submerged feature at the beginning of 
Ca.stile time (Upper Pennian). Lowlands surrounded the Delaware basin 
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and tidal flats were found in the east. These tidal flats experienced no 
new sedimentation or erosion during this period and had narrow flow channels 
running through them. These narrow channels contained intennittent permeable 
barriers, and this flow system resulted in the connection of the Gulf coast 
basin and the Castile sea. The same shallow marine sea existed to the 
southwest of the bar cordoning off the Delaware Basin. 9 
Marinewaterentered the Castile Sea from the south or southwest through 
one or more narrow channels. A sand dune ridge composed of calcareous sands 
and organic reef probably composed the barrier. This barrier was overcome 
by seasonal stonn waves and closed by normal wind action. These storm waves 
contained sufficient force to eject the concentrated brines into the eastern 
tidal flat channels and on into the Gulf Coast basin. The water wa s 
evaporated and halite accumulated. The repetitive cyc le caused the absence 
of halite in the Castile anhydrite of the Delaware Basin and the absence of 
anhydrite in the Louann Salt in the Gulf Coast Basin10 (Hazzard et al.). 
The hypothesis of an Upper Triassic--Lower Jurassic age dating of the 
Louann salt is the most widely believed hypothesis. The main thrust of 
evidence is presented by Murray (1961). 
Correlative evidence stems from the clastic-evaporite sequence of 
eastern and southern Mexico in the southwestern portion of the Rio Grande 
embayment. Imlay et al. (1948), 11 correlated the red beds of the Huizachal 
formation (probably Lower-Middl e Jurassic) with the Eag le Mill s Formation 
of the Gulf region. The Louann is thought to be equiva lent to the discon-
fonnity between the Huizachal Fonnation and overlying Upper Oxfordian 
limestone in east and north Mexico. The Huizachal Group spottily overlies 
early Jurassic strata, and Huizachal red beds yield Middle Jurassic-
Triassic plant fossils. 
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The Eagle Mills-Werner-Louann underlie Late Jurassic Smackover and 
Norphelt Formations and lie overPaleozoic (Permian and older) and Paleozoic 
Precambrian. Correlation can be made between a formation of over 2000 feet 
of evapodte, . mainly composed of anhydrite, which exists in the Sabinas 
Basin in northeastern Mexi co. The evaporite underlies the Zuloaga limestone, 
an equivalent to the Smackover Formation of Upper Jurass ic Oxfordian age. 
The sulphate concentrate is equi valent to the Louann salt. 12 
A structural correlation between the Louann sa lt and other thick 
accumulations of salt in the coastal area, and thick Late Jurassic deposits 
is made through their proximity to an inner-boundary fault system. 13 The 
salts are restricted basinward as i s the inner extent of the Late Jurassic 
deposits. 
Fossil evidence has been wide ly used to date the Louann salt. 14 Salt 
domes in northern Cuba have produced spores of Mesozoic age which are no 
younger than Early Cretaceous. Red algae of the Permian was found at 
Markham, Matagorda County, Texas, in 1924. The plant fossil Macrotaeniop-
teris magnifolic has been found in the Eagle Mills formation of southern 
Arkansas. Since the Louann salt is strat igraphically above the Eagle Mill s 
fonnation it can be no older than Upper Trai ssic and is probably Early to 
Middle Jurassi c in age. Spores of predominantly Upper Triassic types have 
been found in salt mines of Texas and Loui siana along with lower Jurassic 
age spores. All of this fossil evidence strongly supports the Louann salt 1 s 
age as being Upper Triassic to Lower Jurassic. This dating has bec001e 
accepted theory by the majority of geologists. 
The deposition and structural development of these Mesozoic salt basins 
and salt dome basins came after the Ouachita Orogeny which ended in Upper 
Permian time. This orogenic activity and its Mexican and Antillean 
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counterparts were responsible for controls set on the structural relationships 
and tectonic features of the Gulf region. 15 Zones of faulting on the inner 
edge of the Gulf region and zones of igneous activity of Cretaceous and 
younger time follow the Ouachita trend. 
The Ouachita structural belt influences positive and negative elements 
of the inner margin of the Gulf Region. 16 These negative and positive elements 
are the result of the Ouachita tectonic belt curving toward and over the 
craton and di splaying broad salients and recesses. Mexico and Northern 
Central America correspondingly display salients of the Paleozoic tectonic 
belt against positive el ements of the coastal province and recesses adjacent 
to negative elements. 
The salt dome basins of Ve~acruz-Tabasco, Rio Grande, East Texas, North 
Louisiana, and the Louisi ana-Mississippi basins are all depocenters within 
salt basins adjacent to arc salients of Paleozoic orogenic belts like the 
Ouachita Orogney. 17 The maximum deposition within these basins are located 
at weak crustal zones whi ch subsided during isostatic adjustment to the 
Paleozoic orogeny. 
The Lou ann salt underl ies the Gulf region including the Gulf of Mexico. 
The single salt basin originated from an ancient barred gulf (Lyons, 1957; 
and Imlay, 1943). This was an extensive area which has given rise to a 
topography within the salt where domeless plains separate dome basins and 
major tectonic features. A thin layer of the Louann sa lt covers these plains. 18 
Localized areas within the basin contain no salt where erosion, non-deposition, 
or flowage from high to low points may have taken place. 
The tectonic feature s within the basin control salt deposition and sa lt 
structure growth. 19 The San Marcos arch of Southeast Texas is a good 
example of a tectonic control of salt deposition and salt structure building. 
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This high has caused the Louann to be thin or absent as well as the 
corresponding salt controlled structures. This area extends from north -
eastern Live Oak County to southwestern Colorado County and from Arkansas to 
Matagorda County along the Gulf of Mexico. The arch separates the Rio Grande 
salt dome basi n and the Texas-Loui s iana coastal (Houston Embayment) salt 
dome basin of which both are depocenters. 
The Louann wa s deposited in the Texas -Louisiana coastal salt dome basin 
and across the Gulf region salt basins at approximately the same time; t ha t 
is, as one continuous sal t basin. However, the development of the salt domes 
in the Gulf region did not take place simultaneou sly. 20 The interior sal t 
domes of east Texas, North Louisiana, and Northern Mississippi developed 
much earlier than the basinward southern Louisiana and offshore domes. 
Andrews described the development of the salt dome basins in t hree 
stages. 21 The first stage is the complete deposition of the Louann salt by 
evaporation. The second stage is divided into two segments. The f irst 
segment descri bes a shore environment with abundant terrigenous sedimentation 
developing nearshore during Upper Jurassic and Lower Cretaceous time. This 
area, at present day, is represented by the east Texas and Loui siana-
Mississippi Interior basin s. Salt domes grew after the Jurassic deposition 
and again after the Cretaceous deposition. The combined overburden of these 
two depositional sequences caused the areas to subside. The sequence of 
Norphelt-Smackover Formations through the Lower Cretaceous Travi s Peak 
Formation was concentrated in the Interior basins area. The facies that 
developed downdip of these formations were deep water marine shales and ooze. 
These deposits were of in sufficient density to cause subsidence and salt 
dome growth. Further subsidence of the interior basi ns was helped by the 
build up of a bioherm in the shallow offshore waters at the edge of the 
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interior basins. 
The second segment of stage two development depicts the depositional 
center as moving basinward (gulfward). This deposition took place in the 
mid-Tertiary. The overburden of these sediments again causes salt structures 
to grow. The pattern of deposition is equivalent to the Mesozoic deposition. 
Today's deposition composes the third stage. The depocenter has again 
moved basinward and has been restricted to a much smaller area. The salt 
structures here developed much later than the Interior basin domes as they 
waited for continued accumulation of Tertiary sediments to apply enough 
pressure on the mother salt bed to create dome structures. 
The extension of thi s model to Mexico, Central America, and Cuba would 
place these domes' origins as possibly Cretaceous,but more probably Middle 
Eocene through Recent. 
ACTUAL SALT STRUCTURE GROWI"H 
Salt structures are developed by tectonic forces or by isostatic forces. 22 
A combination of the two is possible. The major belief among geologists is 
that isostatic forces are the predominant producers of salt dome st'.uctures. 
Halbouty (1910, 1913) and Arrhenius (1912) were early proponents of the 
isostatic theory. 23 Their work stated the two principal ideas behind 
isostatic salt flow. One idea is that salt is forced upward fran the mother 
salt bed by the increasing load of overlying sediments that are being 
deposited. The other notion is that the salt flows up through these over-
lying sediments because the specific gravity is less than the surrounding 
sediments. 
B f h 1 b t d th t . . 1 "d 24 s d. t arton urt er e a ora e on ese wo pr1nc1pa l eas. e imen s 
are laid on top of the mother bed and cause the top of the basement (flat 
non-domed salt) to subside. The mother bed subsides to this new position. 
The domal salt core of the bed, because of its lighter specific gravity, 
(lighter than the surrounding sediments), remains at its original position 
11 floating 11 in the denser sediments. The overlying sedi ments cause the 
mother salt to plastically flow inward, underneath the salt core. This 
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becomes the root of the dome. Meanwhile, the flanks of the mother bed have 
been pressed down and slightly inward. The inward movement of mother salt 
to the root of the dome stops when no more mother salt is left (zero thickness) 
as isostatic equilibrium is met, or as rate of subsidence slows or stops. 
The structure wi 11 continue to fl ow after deposition ceases, but not towards 
the dome root. 
Nettleton's "fluid mechanical theory" basically agrees with Barton's 
model. 25 Nettleton emphasizes the upward flow of both the salt and surrounding 
sediments. They behave as very vi scous liquids at depth and then flow very 
slowly over great lengths of geologic time. The prime reason for sustai ned 
flow is the difference in density between salt (specific gravity 2.2) and 
sediments .(specific gravity 1.7-2.0 at surface, but a denser 2.4-2.8 at 
depth). The 1 ighter sa 1 t 11 fl oats" through the denser sediments driven by 
this isostatic disequilibrium force. 
Nettleton found the final shape of the dome structure to be determined 
by the tectonic feature restricting the dome, the thickness of the mother 
salt, the strength and vi scosity of the overlying strata, and the strength 
or viscosity of the salt itself .26 
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Nettleton perceived a tectonic or orogenic force as t he early impetus of 
salt dome development. 27 An upli ft which does not alter t he thickness of 
the salt is favored, and Nettl eton believed flow began and continued as 
deposition continued overhead. The dome then breaks t hrough over lyi ng 
sediment and actually carri es some of these rocks with it as it moves 
continually upward. The core i s now a substantiating upward flow., by itself 
without push from the mother bed as the salt supply from t he mother bed has 
been halted by the formation of the peripheral sink dep ression. The peripheral 
sink is formed by the upward movi ng salt stock's delet ing of the mother salt 
until it is very thin. The depression is filled by the downfaulting of over -
lying sediments which restricts fu rther flow of supply sa l t. 
Erosion removes the original overlying sediment f rom above the dome 
area. The material which the dome was pushing ahead of i tse l f has now been 
eroded, and groundwater acting on the salt has formed t he cap rock. Over-
lying beds which the dome had forced to overturn now co ll apse into t he dome ' s 
peripheral sink as block f ault members. 
The salt dome described above is known as a shallow "piercement" dome as 
it rises to a shallow depth, and has "·pierced" the overlying strata on its 
journey upward. Any dome that reaches above a 1000 foo t depth is consi dered 
to be a shallow dome. Intermedi ate domes are those wh i ch reach a depth of 
between 1000 and 6000 feet. Deep seated domes are the domes found below a 
depth of 6000 feet. Nettl eton explains the deep seated domes as bei ng sa lt 
structures which were separated from the mother bed by competently strong 
overlying strata. 28 This strat a descends through the per ipheral si nk and 
merges with the underlying strata to successfully separat e the salt dome 
from the mother bed's supply of salt. 
Halbouty and Hardin (1956) do not believe the tectonic or orogenic 
impetus is necessary to initiate salt dome flow. 29 A sufficient load of 
overlying sediment is the only force required to start the flow process. 
The main driving force i s the differential between the salt's specific 
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gravity and the surrounding and overlying sediments' specific gravity. The 
salt's rate of flow is controlled by the amount of sediment deposited over 
the salt bed flanks as the dome rises through the surrounding sediments 
through geologic time. The salt stock will slow until the surrounding load 
becomes thick enough to induce greater compressive force on the flanks of 
the salt bed, and subsequent accelerated flow rate of the stock due to the 
regained disequilibirum of densities between the salt and the surrounding 
sediments. Sediments directly overlying the salt dome are eroded during 
this stage of slowed movement. The salt dome's top will undergo alteration 
to cap rock as the stock top is thrust into groundwater near the earth' s 
surface. The stock virtually stops flowing upward at this point due to the 
obtainment of isostatic equilibrium between the salt and the surrounding 
near surface strata as their specific gravities are equal or as the surrounding 
strata's specific gravity is even less than the salt 's specific gravity. 
The salt dome growth cycle of loading, increased upward flow rate, 
decreasing upward flow rate, semi-donnancy, and loading continually repeats 
itself until equilibrium is met. The flow rates of dome structures are also 
affected by the amount of supply salt from the mother bed, and by restriction 
by competently strong overlying fonnations. 
The examination of peripheral basin sediments surrounding a piercement 
dome display a history of the repetitive cycle. The semi-dormant stage is 
represented by an unconformity due to erosion of the surrounding sediments . 
These erosional structures must be discerned before faulting can be 
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interpreted in the core section investigations of the area. 
The fonnation of the Gulf region salt domes due to isostasy is the 
accepted theory of origin among geologists. However, studies of Iranian 
salt flows show both a t ectonic and isostatic origin. 30 The Imam Reza and 
Sari-i-Naftak diapirs· are considered to be originated by a rising anticline. 
As the folds of this anticline closed with increased tightness the salt was 
transfonned into a sheet-like flow which now appears lying on the surface 
and flows as a salt glacier. 
Other salt structures in Iran are elevated by isostatic forces caused 
by a sinking syncline descending into the mother salt bed. These salt 
plateaus have risen above their nonnally overlying sediments and rest 
some 1000 feet above them (O'brien, 1957). 
The general theory of isostatic growth has been examined by modelling 
to obtain the parameters at which salt will flow. Halbouty states that 
Parker and McDowell have done a thorough investigation of initiation of salt 
flow structures. Halbouty lists four of their initial impeti: 31 
1) Irregularities on the surface of the overburden, either 
depressions or proj ections from the general level of the surface. 
2) Variations in the thickness of the overburden. 
3) Natural variations in the density of the overburden. 
4) External stresses producing faults or folds in the overburden 
which produced varying pressure differentials on the salt 
equivalent surface. 
The first three impeti are those seen in nonnal isostatic initiation. 
The first impetus could be applied to the sinking syncli ne found in Iran as 
it descends from thesurface and applys pressure to the mother salt. The 
second impetus is the most common initiator of flow and later increases and 
decreases the rate of flow. Third impetus refers to the restriction and 
non-restriction of the dome's upward flow. The last impetus results in the 
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tectonic initiation as seen in the Imam Reza and Sari-i-Naftak diapirs 
which are formed by anticlinal folding. 
The overlying sediment load is the main initiator of salt flow. The 
amount of burial or more precisely the depth at which salt will flow is then 
an important parameter of flow. Balk (1949) determined that salt will flow 
due to a shearing stress of 30 kg/cm3 (427 lbs/in2). 32 Parker and McDowe ll 
determined that this shearing force can be achieved by compressive forces of 
853 lbs/in2• Lower stress strengths could initiate flow if applied over a 
long enough period of time. 
The results of the stress studies found that extremely deep burial was 
unnecessary for the initiation of salt flow. 33 A sediment load of only 
1000 feet could cause sal t to flow if the salt bed is of appropriate t hick-
ness. McDowell and Parker also found that there was a maximum limit of 
overburden through which a salt structure could flow. This limit wa s 
controlled by the competent strength of the overburden. 
An agreement between McDowell and Parker's figure of a required 1000 
feet of overburden to induce flow was reached by Trusheim in Germany. 34 
He found that 1000 feet of overburden acting on a 300 foot thickness of salt 
would induce flow within the salt. 
Increased depth creates increased temperature, pressure, and strai n 
which effect buried rock bodies. 35 These factors increase the viscosity of 
rock and the plasticity of salt. A salt body is found to be perfectly 
plastic at 25,000 feet of burial. The 200°c mark is the minimum temperature 
for rupture-free flow of a salt body. These conditions are not present, for 
the ~most part, throughout the salt basins of the world. Therefore, salt 
will flow under less than idealistic conditions of viscous flow. 
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Creep can partly expl ain the flow of salt under these less than ideal 
viscous flow conditions. 36 Creep is the movement of a rock body from a 
higher elevation to a lower elevation due to the effects of gravity. Salt 
will flow due to creep if the basement, or underlying rock it rests upon, 
is dipping at an angle of as little as one degree. The result of this flow 
is a supply of salt to the peripheral sink or a farther inward addition of 
salt to the rising salt structure. 
Salt dome structures not only arise from less than ideal conditions, 
but also from loading not caused by direct sedimentation overlying the 
flanks of the dome. The process present in such a situation fonns secondary 
domes concentrically surrounding a master dome. 37 
The master dome devel ops due to the accepted pattern of loading and 
growth of any salt structure. The key variable in the development of the 
secondary domes is the formation of the master dome's peripheral sink (that 
depression surrounding the dome root where the salt structure has drawn the 
salt from the mother bed and subsequently "thinned" the salt bed in this 
area). The subsidence by graben faulting of fringe sediments into the sink 
itself and the upward growth of the master dome causes disequilibrium between 
overlying sediments and the surrounding thick salt bordering the peripheral si nk. 
This load disequilibriITT causes the grov1th of the smaller secondary domes. 
A good example of the master- secondary dome arrangement is the Spindletop 
complex in east Texas. 38 The Spindletop dome is considered to be the master 
dome while anticlines situated in an arc to the east of Spindletop are 
contributed to secondary deep seated domes, and are associated with nonnal 
faulting. The Port Neches dome lying east of Spindletop is thought to be 
a secondary dome because it approximately lies within the anticlinal arc. 
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Studies have been made of the genetic relationship among salt structures 
or groups of salt structures in the Northwest Germany basin originating from 
the zechstein salt bed. 39 The old primary dome of initial origin is called 
the mother dome. This dome triggers the fonnation of daughter or even third 
and additional generations of salt structures. 
The arrangement of salt domes in this area begins with elongate and 
meandering salt walls or ridges in the deepest part of the basin. A set of 
salt domes neighbors these ridges and these in turn are surrounded by salt 
pillows in the shallower part of the basin. This is similar to the Gulf 
region arrangement. 
One explanation of this sa lt complex suggests the structures were formed 
by a rhythmic . wave passing through the salt bed. 40 Theinitiatornf the wave 
is the growth of the primary mother salt stock. The wavefront travels 
through the salt from the deepest portion to the shal lower outer rim of the 
salt bed. This disturbs the equilibrium of the mother bed, and triggers the 
fonnation of the succeeding generations of domes. 
A second explanation of the regional salt pattern suggests that the 
pattern is coordinated to a fault system in the basement strata underlying 
the salt bed. 41 Trusheim believes the salt begins in a pi1low stage 
(upraised mounds of salt with gently sloping sides and gently curved tops). 
The salt then flows inward, and steepens the dip of the sides of the pillow 
until it breaks through the overlying sediment and begins to flow as a diapir. 
Salt structures are predominately fanned by disequilibrium isostatic 
forces occurring within the earth's crust, although tectonic compression 
may have induced salt flow in some of the diapirs of Iran. The salt 
structure arises from the mother salt bed which was deposited as an evaporite 
in a barred basin long before the formation of the salt structures. 
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Sediments are loaded on top of this mother bed over great lengths of geologic 
time, and compress the salt bed. Shear forces are spawned by these compressive 
forces and with the help of increased temperature and pressure cause the salt 
to flow inward to a central core. This core intrudes into the overlying 
strata as greater loading applys pressure to the flanks of the salt bed, and 
drives more salt inward to supply the now rising core or dome. The dome now 
floats upward due to the differences of its own and the surrounding strata's 
specific gravities. Domes .which are able to "pierce" their way through the 
overlying sediments and reach depths close to the surface are known as 
sha 11 ow 11 piercement 11 domes. There are al so intennediate piercement domes, 
and finally deep-seated domes which reached equilibrium with the surrounding 
strata deeper within the earth. A shallow piercement dome is able to trigger 
the formation of other peripheral domes by creating additional disequilibrium 
within the surrounding strata. This is termed by American geologists as the 
master and secondary dome arrangement. 
SHAPE AND COMPOSITION 
The top of a salt dome can be circular or elliptical. Circular slopes 
are common to the United States whereas ellipses are predominant in the 
Isthmian embayment of Mexico. 42 The top of the dome can range from a half 
mile to four miles in diameter with the average being two miles in the Gulf 
area. The salt stock is generally cylindrical, but the flanks may be 
inclined as well as vertical. The top of the dome may be flat or slightly 
convex. There are cases of highly irregular to steeply inclined surfaces 
and generally the top mushrooms and overhangs the cylinder of the salt 
stock. 
17 
The composition of the salt mass itself is a very pure sodium chloride 
(halite) with minor impurities of calcium sulphate (anhydrite) usua lly 
amounting to less than three percent of the stock ' s composition.43 Traces 
of dolomite, calcite, barite, pyri te, quartz, iron minerals, celestite, and 
sulphur are also present within the hal ite. 
The halite itself is coarsely crystalline with ind ividual crystals 
ranging in size from a quarter to half an inch in diamte r. 44 Layering is 
commonly seen in the salt stock, and each layer is from one to ten inches 
in thickness. Interbedding is also present and is cha racterized by pure white 
halite and impure gray (anhydrite and dolomite) bandi ng. Evidence of the 
stress put on the salt stock is represented by the presence of folding 
(mostly isoclinal) and by the presence of recrysta llization. 
~PROCK 
Cap rock is most commonly found in the shallowest piercement domes. 
However, it has been found as deep as 10,000 feet . The average thicknes s 
of cap rock is from 300 to 400 feet with the extreme being about 1000 feet. 
It is usually thick over the center of the dome, thinni ng towards the 
periphery, and thin to absent on the flanks. 45 
Anhydrite is the dominant compound al ways found in cap rock, and is 
dissolved directly out of the salt stock. The an hydrite is then altered to 
(in order of abundance ) gypsum, calcite, and sulphur. The structure of cap 
rock i:s usually brecciated especially on it s upper area. A fal se cap rock 
may exist above the true cap rock. Thi s structure is composed of calcareous 
and siliceous cementations and sometimes of shal es which have been carried 
above the salt dome as it penetrated through the overlying strata. 
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46 Nonnal cap rock can be divided into three mineral differentiated zones: 
1) a lower anhydrite zone, 2) middle transitional zone characterized by 
gypsum, calcite, suphur and sometimes a variable mineralogic suite, and 
3) the upper calcite zone. The layers are unequally distributed and highly 
gradational. The lithology can grade from pure anhydrite to pure gypsllTI 
over a few inches or over several feet. 
The anhydrite zone is found directly above the salt stock. The 
anhydrite may extend over the salt stock and travel down the stock as far 
as 5000 feet. The anhydrite layer makes up the majority of the cap rock and 
wherecap·rock is deeply buried anhydrite is usually found alone. This is 
the original cap . rock. 
The transition zone is the layer which contains sulphur in either small 
quantities to terrifically economic reserves, and is an intermediary 
gradational zone separating the anhydrite and calcite zones. The transition 
zone is an irregular structure, but is usually thicker near the flanks than 
in the center of the cap rock. 47 
The transition zone is the scene of active alteration of the anhydrite 
to gypslJTl, calcite, and suphur~ Alteration begins at the top of the anhydrite 
zone, and descends down through the anhydrite creating the transition zone. 
The anhydrite will alter directly to calcite if the anhydrite .zoneisthickenough 
and calcite will continue to form as the transition zone develops. The transition 
zone is also the only zone of alteration where gypsum is produced. The 
gypsum deposit is fanned far more easily than either calcite or sulphur. 
Anhydrite alters to gypsum due to hydration of water molecules. The 
water enters the anhydrite via shear planes and fracture lines. Each 
individual anhydrite grain is then attacked along its cleavage planes. The 
result is a gypsum deposit made up of many small interlocking crystals 
remaining in the outline of the original anhydrite grain. 49 The final 
gypsum product is made up of large irregularly interlocking crysta l s as 
the smaller crystals fuse together. 
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The alteration of anhydrite to calcite or sulphur may begin before the 
alteration of anhydrite to gypsum. 50 Usually the calcite and sulphur 
alteration continues after the gypsum production, but in a few cases the 
calcite and sulphur alteration has been stopped. 
Calcite and sulphur replace the anhydrite and gypsum directly in 
substantial quantities. 51 Large amounts of both minerals exist in veins 
and calcite and sulphur will replace anhydrite faster in the absence of 
gypsum. 
Anhydrite forms the initial cap rock with lesser primary cry st a 11 i zat ions 
·of dolomite , quartz, cal cite, barite, and celestite. These are incorporated 
into the transition zone with the anhydrite. Calcite and sulphur begin to 
form along shear zones of the anhydrite and around the dolomite rhombs. 
Individual grains, and finally the cleavage planes of the anhydrite themselves 
are attacked. The anhydrite structure is well preserved by the replacement, 
especially by the sulphur which even retains the anhydrite grains cleavage 
planes. 52 The replacement of gypsum by calcite and sulphur is slower due to 
less cleavage planes to attack. The accessory minerals are also replaced 
by calcite, but only partially by sulphur. 
The sulphur and calci te develop together, are closely related, and 
are of the same age. 53 Sulphur grains are found within calcite, fine calcite 
crystals ¥1ithin , sulphur, and intergrowths beb1een the two in sheer"veins off 
the main sulphur veins. 
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Disseminated sulphur is found spread throughout the transition zone 
or immedi ate ly above it. 54 Vein calcite and sulphur produced at severa l 
different stages are younger than the disseminated sulphur, and are always 
found associated with di sseminated sulphur. Yellow bands of sulphur are 
produced wh ere veins foll ow horizontal shear zones. Well developed crystal s 
of both sulphur and calci te occur in cavities and in the partings of shear 
zones. 
The calcite zone li es above the transition zone. It follows the pattern 
f th t •t. . . l •t. 55 o e rans1 ion zone irregu ar1 ies. It is thicker toward the f l anks 
than at the center of the cap rock. The ca lei te zone extends down the fl an ks 
as far as several thousand feet. It is useful to think of the transition zone 
as moving down through the anhydrite zone from the calcite zone and leaving 
alteration products of calcite. and sulp hur behi-nd. 
Calcite occurs throughout the entire extent of the cap rock. All other 
accessory minerals are associated with the calcite. 56 Calcite and sulphur 
are again found together in the sulphur-bearing portion of the calcite zone . 
The replacement again i s in the pseudomorph fonn of the anhydrite grains. 
Sulphur is important in the calcite zone especial ly in the lower part. 
The upper part of the cal cite zone is considered to be 11 barren cap 11 where 
any sulphur has been repl aced by calcite and pyrite. 57 
The cap rock is created by undersaturated groundwater di sso l vi ng and 
altering the salt itself. Ptly dome which does not reach shallow enough 
depth to be attacked by circul ating groundwater will have no cap rock. 
Salt domes which have only recently been thrusted into the groundwater zone 
will have no cap rock or only a thin or patchy layer of cap rock composed 
only of residual anhydrite. 
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58 The dome is attacked most vigorously at its apex. Cementation of 
surrounding sediments takes place at this early stage and begins to form 
the false cap rock. Anhydrite is being dissolved out of the halite and is 
settling in pockets and solution cavities in the salt surface to form an 
anhydrite sand consisting of individual grains of the mineral : of exact 
composition as seen in the host halite. Waters ~lso attack the sides of 
the stock, and anhydrite also begins to accumulate on these flanks. 
The top oft he sa 1 t dome is 1eve1 ed off, and a fl at surf ace is farmed where 
anhydrite sand accumulates in greater volume. 58 The false cap rock protects 
it from contamination and the anhydrite remains pure except for the other 
insolubles (dolomite, pyrite, etc.) being dissolved out of the salt stock 
itself. 
The cap rock shrinks in size and tightens vertically due to the partial 
collapse of the false cap rock and the:continued upthrust of the salt dome. 
Anhydrite precipitates from the sulphurous brine and individual grains begin 
to coalesce to form a matty residue. 
Salt continues to be removed by erosive action of the groundwater, but 
new salt to be attacked is provided by the continued upthrust of the salt 
plug. Sedimentation continues above the salt plug, and is compensated for 
by the upthrusting. The anhydrite becomes brecciated by the upthrusting of 
the dome and collapse of the false cap rock and of the newly formed true 
cap rock. Anhydrite on both the top and the flanks of the dome is broken 
and recemented repeatedly during this phase of alteration . 59 
A marked difference is now perceived in the formation of cap rock. 
The anhydrite begins to be altered itself. This is the beginning of the 
transition zone. The anhydrite alters first to gypsum (hydrous CaS04),and 
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both subsequently alter to calcite and finally to sulphur. A. rseudomorph of the 
anhydrite gypsum crystalline structure is retained by the calcite and 
sulphur. At this time gypsum might be the only alteration product formed 
solely by hydration. 60 A thin or thick layer of anhydrite might be present 
when the transition zone begins. its formation. 
The transition zone continues its formation moving downward t hrough the 
anhydrite. The anhydrite is reduced to H2s gas which in turn may be oxidized 
to sulphur. Calcite is a l so continually formed from calcium cations liberated 
from the anhydrite and from co3 anions present in the groundwater. A thick 
accumulation of this cal cite forms the calcite zone above the transition zone 
(actually replacing the transition zone in this area ). The upper part of 
this zone sees the formation of secondary veins of calcite, sulphur, sulphides , 
barite and celestite. 61 The last three compounds will also replace su lphur 
in the tran sition zone. Hydrocarbons which enter in with the groundwaters 
reduce the sulphur and redeposit it in another oxidizing environment in the 
cap rock or it may escape. The groundwater continues to circulate in t he 
upper calcite zone dissolving out pockets and caverns. Removal of sulphur 
may form additional cavi ties, and any remaining salt is dissolved out causes 
collapse of the lower part of the zone. 62 Salt domes at this stage have 
either commercial deposit s of sulphur or thick barren calcite zones devoid 
of sulphur. 
The salt dome now slows its entrance into the circulating groundwater 
region. A cementation seal is formed around the cap rock effecti vely 
blocking or retarding the entrance of fresh groundwater. The cap rock 1 s 
. growth is essentially ended at this point. Sulphur producing salt domes 
are examplative of this phase of development. 
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The cap rock in its fi na 1 stage begi!ns to be destroyed. It may be 
eroded if uplifted to the surface or shattered by sudden upli ft of the dome 
if it is a thin cap. 63 A sudden uplift by the salt dome may also maroon 
a thick cap rock at a lower l evel below the surface . 
The thickness of cap rock i s therefore dependent on accumulation 
conditions, total amount of salt dissolved, and the amount of an hydrite and 
other mineral residue in the salt. The complete absence of sal t is due to 
unfavorable accumulation conditions or because the salt stock has been so 
recent ly upthrust into the groundwater area that the groundwater has had 
insufficient time to alter the stock head. 
The transition zone appears only after a substantial thickness of 
anhydrite has been formed. Altering sol utions enter from the flanks or 
laterally and are petroleum and hydrogen sulphide l aden. 64 Tbe alteri ng of 
the anhydrite occurs by reduction followed by oxidation. 
An abionic description of the react ions in the transition zone which 
produce native sulphur begin with the reduction of anhydrite in excess of 
hydrogen sulphide which creates calcium sulphide. This calci um sulphide is 
quickly reduced to hydrogen sulphide which in turn is irrmediately oxidized 
to sulphur or migrates to an oxidi zing environment within the cap rock and 
is then oxidized. 65 Calcite is formed by the reaction of the hydrolyzed 
reduction by-product calcium hydroxide with dissolved carbon di ox ide 
existing as carbonic acid in groundwater . This process is represented by 
the chemical equations: 
CaS + 2H20 + Ca(OH) 2 + H2S 
Ca(OH)2 + H2co3 + CaC03 + 2H20 
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A biogenic description of these same reactions which is highly believed 
by scientists begins with the reduction of anhydrite by the anaerobic 
bacteria named Desulfovibrio. Utili zing organic carbon from: 1) nearby 
petroleum deposits, 2) the hydro carbons in the groundwater or, 3) a 
preceeding heterotrophic bacteria which could better metaboli ze hydrocarbon65 
as reducing power, the anhydrite is broken down to carbon dioxide and 
calcium sulphide. These products lead to the formation of calcite and 
hydrogen sulphide. The hydrogen sulphide is then oxi dized at the site or 
again migrates to a more benefici al oxidizing environment in the cap rock 
and is oxidized to native sulphur. The processes are described by these 
equations: 
· sulfate 
Caso4 + 2Corg reducers> 2C02 + CaS 
CaS + C02 + H20 + CaC03 + H2S 
H2S + ~02 + s0 + H20 
Cap rock deposits of sulphur and calcite are cons idered to be epigenetic. 66 
This means they are developed in preformed host rock which are norma lly 
associated with terrestrial environments. The process of sul phate reduction 
by the Desulfovibrio is known as dissimilatory sulphate reduction. 67 It is 
most cormnonly associated with the respiration of marine anaerobic bacteria. 
The sulphate itself is known as the bacteria's termi nal electron receptor68 
which combines with the one-cell ed biotum's biochemicals to give the 
organism energy to function and reproduce. 
Sulphate reducers, e.g. Desul fovibrio, perform sulphur isotope 
fractionalization because the bacteria can discern t he difference between 
32 34 . 69 32 . S and S isotopes of sulphur. The S isotope us ua 11 y composes 95.1% 
of all compounds while 34s isotope composes about 4.2% of all sulphur 
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compounds. The 32 s134s ratio of natural sulphur compo und is between 21 .3 
and 23.2. Meteoritic sulphur has a 32s;34s ratio of 22.22. This meteoritic 
ratio, because of its unifonnity between samples, is used as a reference 
standard to compare other ratios of sulphur compounds. 
&34S = 34s132s sample ~ 34s132s ~eteoritic or standard 
34s132s meteoritic or standard 
The comparison of sulphur compounds found in nature to the standard helps to 
differenti ate between biogenically and abiogenically formed sulphur compounds. 
Abiogenic ~34s values generally fall within a narrow range with a positive 
sign whil e biogenic o34s values fall within a wide range and have a negat ive 
sign. 
Feely and Kulp (1957) have applied this ratio in a number of intriguing 
ways to the salt dome , its cap rock, and to sulphur generation. They 
· detennined that a singl e evaporative seq uence (e.g. the Louann salt) was 
responsible for all of the salt domes in the Gul f Coast area by utili zi ng 
the 32s1 34s ratio of sulphate found in the salt of t he qnhydrite. 70 
The 32s134s ratio of sulphate present in the halite stock and the 
anhydrite cap rock substantiates the theory of origin of cap rock from the 
residue in the salt. 71 
Evidence to support the bio.geni c generation of cap rock sul phur has 
a beginning as based on the l ength of time it would take pet rol eum to 
reduce sulphate versus Desulfovibrio to complete the same process. 
Petrol eum reduction would involve about 150 million years whil e Desulfovibrio 
reduction would involve less than a million years. The petrol eum time 
is almost as old in inception as the Louann salt is in its deposition 
whereas the Desulfovibrio reduct i on time span is much closer to the 
length of time salt dome s have been present and exposed to groundwater. 
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Desulfovibrio causes fractionalization of sulphur isotopes during 
reduction of sulphate. 72 The bacteria's slow growth enriches hydrogen 
sulphide by at least 2.7% over the initial sulphur -32 content of original 
sulphate. Domes with ilTITiature cap rock show a correspondingly lower enrich-
ment level (e.g. 1.2% at 5pindletop) compared to domes with mature cap rock 
(e.g. 3.8% at Moss Bluff). This is further evidence for the belief in the 
"sulphate reduction perforr1ed by Desul fovi brio theory 11 cs similarly seen in 
the enrichme1it of calcite cap rock. A varied 325;345 ratio in the 
cal cite cap rock eludes to an Emvrionment of separated, small scale 
biochemical interactions. This is consistent with anaerobic bacteria's 
widely varied 03% values. 73 
The isotopic composition of the native sulphur in cap rock is heavie r 
than related hydrogen sulphide and 1 ighter than 1. associated sulphate which 
verifies its production by su lphate -H25 reaction (this is the standard 
model where native sulphur attains more 345 than 325 isotope). 74 
Two interesting points about calcite cap rock involve its composition 
and thickness. Calcite of salt dome cap rock can be differentiated from 
that of conventional sedimentary lime by its 13c;12c ratio which, for the 
cap rock lime, is closer to a petroleum ratio than to that of a normal 
lime ratio. 75 The second point is that a thick calcite cap rock illustrates 
the image of the dome at some point intruded through a petroliferous 
horizon very close (about a mile) beneath the surface. 76 
Finally, isotopic composition is unifonn for cap rock sulphur pointing 
to considerable isotopic exchange and supporting the theory of fractiona li -
zation of sulphur by bacteria instead of chemical formation. 
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The collective proof strongly favors biogenic emplacement of sulphur 
within the cap rock. Economi cally exploitable caprock will be that which 
is highly matured and contains thi ckened transition and calcite zones, where 
anhydrite has been highly reduced by ~sulfovibrio and effectively trapped 
within the cap rock as sulphur. 
SULPHUR 
Sulphur is the eighteenth most abundant mineral in the earth's crust. 
It occurs 1) in its pure uncombined form which is known as native sulphur 
or brimstone, 2) in combination with metallic elements to form sulphides 
(e.g. pyrite FeS2) or sul fosalts (e.g. tetrahedrite cu12sb4s13 ) and 
3) combined with oxygen to form the sulphate (so4)-
2 anion whi ch then 
singly bonds with a vari ety of l arge divalent cations to form sulphates 
{e.g. anhydrite Caso4). 
Native sulphur is found 1) around and inside the craters and fumaroles 
of volcanoes, 2) as encrustations at the edges of hot sulphur springs and 
3) embedded in limestone as in the cap rock of salt domes. 
Sulphur has been part of man' s culture since ancient times. ·The \r!it ch 
doctors of primitive tribes used sulphur to drive away evil spirits with its thick 
and i rritatin(] smoke. The tribes al so used sulphur to ki 11 insect s and to bl each their 
feathers, furs, and wool. The Greeks used it in killing insects and to 
dispel illness from homes. The Egyptians made medicinal salves out of 
brimstone. Pliny described sulphur in his Natural History and ta lks of its 
mining, refinement, and use in art and industry. The Romans used sulphur 
tn its traditional ways and devised the first incendiary bombs made of 
rosin, bitumen, and sulphur. The Chinese developed gunpowder in 1200 A.D. 
by mixing 70-75% saltpeter (NaN03),14-16% charcoal, and 10-15% sulphur. 
Gunpowder was a key to ending the Feudal System of Europe, and remai ned 
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the only explosive compound until after the Boer War in the early 1900's. 77 
The advent of sulphuric acid was the beginning of the great demand for 
sulphur. Oil of vitriol was first created by heating Feso4 or pyrite under 
a glass bell and passing the flJlles through water. This process was soon 
followed by Jobann Glauber , an al chemist who added niter-nitrate to brim-
stone and placed the mixture under a glass bell. This created so3 instead 
of so2 and by putting these fume s through water obtai ned: so3 + H2o + H2so4, 
1 h . . d 78 su p uric ac1 • 
Sulphuric acid was and is the mainstay of the chemical industry. 79 
Innovation in the manufact ure of sul phuric acid and in the chemical 
industry for the consumption of sulphuric acid have led to the sulphuric acid 
industry's growth and subsequently to the sulphur industry's expansion. 
Innovations in the manufacture of sulphuric aci d include: 1) the lead 
chamber - John Roebuck, M.D., inventor Britain - it replaced the glass bell 
- and in so doing increased the quantity of acid produced a hundred fo ld 
as the number and size of the chambers grew; 2) the Peraett furnace - 1833 
- so2 obtained from roasting pyrites good for the pyrite ilndustry but not 
native sulphur, the di·sadvantagesof this process are the impurit ies it 
produces in the acid, handling and labor costs, and f ly ash pollution, 
3) ultra strength H2so4 produced by Nordhausen, Bohemia by fum ing aci d 
oleum from ferrous sulphate, and 4) the contact method where so2 is 
converted to so3 directly by means of a catalyst and uses brimstone as raw 
material the acid produced is pure, strong, less labor i s needed and 
handling is cheaper. No fly ash is produced. 
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The development of demand of sulphuric acid and of sulphur directly 
include: 1) Leblanc Process Soda Alkali business to produce Naco3 (soda-
ash) for industrial manufacturing, the acid is used to decompose NaCl, 
2) 1873 - lime - sulphite paper pulp process developed by Swedish chemist 
C. D. Ekmann - uses sulphur directly , 3) sul phur being used in vulcanization 
of rubber to make it more resi stant to water, resiliant, temperat ure 
independent, weather independent, elastic, 80 4) Liebig ' s research into 
plant foods spawned the fertilizer ind ustry - sul phuric acid used to make 
super-phosphates by treating phosphate rock - fertilize r is sti ll the main 
consumer of sulphuric acid today - and main impetus behind sul phuric acid 
sulphur industry growth, 5) production of kerosene after the Civil War 
spawned the use of sulphuric acid in petroleum refinement and, 6) the 
development of synthetic fibers uses sulphuric acid. A more complete list 
of industries and products consuming su lphur today are: 
acids 
alcohols 
alum 
ammonium sulphate 
aniline 
bleaching agent 
bromine 
carbon dioxide 
carbon disulphide 
carbon tetrachloride 
casein 
cellphane 
celluloid 
ce 11 ul ose esters 
cements 
chlorine 
coke 
copper 
dehydrating agent 
detergents 
dyes 
ebonite 
el ectropl ati ng 
explosives 
fertili zers 
fire extinguishers 
fireproofi ng agents 
firework s 
food preservatives 
fumi gants 
fungicides 
glue 
glycerin 
imp regnant 
inorganic or organic acids 
insecticides 
leather 
livestock food 
lubricants 
magnesium 
matches 
medicine 
metallurogy 
paints and pigments 
paper pulp 
petroleum products 
pharmace uticals 
phenol 
photography 
pl astics 
pl ate glass 
rayon 
refrigerants 
resins 
road-s urfacing 
materials 
rubber goods 
soap 
soada 
sol vents 
steel pickling and 
ga lvanizing 
storage batteries 
sugar 
sulphonated oils 
synthetic fibers 
synthet ic rubber 
t exti l es 
ti res, rubber 
water purification 
and more 
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The sulphur to supply these industries comes from both elemental 
(uncombined with any other element in molecular structure) and nonelementa l 
(combined with another el ement in molecular structure and used in non -separated 
form) sources . Elemental production includes: 1) the Frasch hot water 
mining process perfonned on the cap rock of salt domes in the Gulf of Mexico 
region and Poland, 2) conventional mining of sedimenta l and surface 
deposits such as the Sicili an deposits (the original world source of modern 
sulphur), west Texas, and western United States, 3) separated from metal in 
metallic sulphides, e.g. pyrites for roasting of which the Spanish pyrites 
are the most famous, and 4) the refinement of H2s gas involved in 
11 sweetening 11 sour natural gas which made Canada the largest producer of 
sulphur in the world. Non -e lemental sources are: 1) H2s from oil refining 
and smelting operations, 2) by-product acid from copper and zinc smelters 
("sludge acid 11 }, and, 3) gypsum and anhydrite deposits some of which are 
most favorably represented in the southwest and west of the Uni ted States. 
Canada is the main producer of sulphur today due to the enonnous sour 
gas fields of Alberta. However, until the advent of the tefine~e nt of H2S to 
sulphur from these sour gas fields arose in the 1950's, the dominant suppli er 
and price leader in the world were the sulphur companies of the Gulf of 
Mexico region. This role was provided for them by the sulphur deposits 
found in the cap rock of salt domes. The mining of these deposits was and 
is facilitated by the Frasch hot water mining method. 
FRASCH AND THE FRASCH HOT WATER MININ G METHOD 
Hennann Frasch was born in WUrtenburg, Gennany on Christmas Day of 
1851. 81 He migrated to the United States in 1870 and became a lab assistant 
to Professor John M. Maisch in the Philadelphia College of Phannacy. 
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Frasch devoted himself to the science of chemistry and particul arly to the 
applications of the science to the newly found and greatly expand ing 
petroleum industry. 
Frasch improved the process for refining paraffin wax in 1876. He sold 
the patent to the Standard Oil Company. 82 John D. Rockefeller was so 
impressed with Frasch that he asked him to move to Cleveland and become a 
consulting chemist specializing in petroleum and its products. He grew 
wealthy as a consultant through hi s expertise in petroleum chemistry. 
Frasch acquired the Empire Oil Company, its wel ls, and small refi nery 
near Petrolia, Ontario in 1885. 83 The site was producing sour crude which 
produced a high sulphur kerosene of poor quality used in lamp lighting. 
Frasch made the kerosene profitabl e by devising a desulphuri zation process 
for his crude. 
Rockefeller at the same time wa s discovering so ur crudes in Ohio. He 
heard Frasch's successful desulphurization process and bought the patents 
and company outright. 84 
Frasch then became the first director of research for the Sta ndard Oil 
Company. Good salary and royalti es on all future inventions in t he petroleum 
ind•1stry were part of his contract. He wa s al so given two months of free 
time, the majority of which he spent working on hi s own inventions. His 
patents and Empire Oil Company had been purchased with Standard Oil Stock. 
Ihe des~phOrization of sour crudes made the Standard Oil Company huge 
profits, and the stock rose to $820/share. 85 Frasch sold half of bis 
stock and became extremely wealthy while retaining his job with Standa rd Oil. 
Besides the contributions to the ea rly oil refini ng techni ques, Frasch 
invented on his own time86 a recovery process for tin scrap, man ufacture of 
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white lead from Galena, manufacture of elements in thennal -e l ectrical 
generators, paraffin wax paper, electric light carbons , produced sodium 
carbonate from salt, first to think of treating old oil well s with hydro-
chloric acid for extended producti on, and the Frasch hot water mining 
process. He held 64 United States patents in all, most of whi ch were huge 
conmercial successes involving industry on a large scale. 87 He increased 
the obtainment of oil and sulphur a thousand-fold before his death on May 1, 
1914. 
Frasch's process is based on the fact that sulphur melts at about 116°C. 
The well is drilled by a rotary ri g si milar to those utilized by the 
petroleum industry. 88 The well contains an arrangement of pipes fitted one 
inside another. There are usually four in today's wells though three can 
be used. The outermost pipe is either eight or ten inches in diameter. 
This pipe is set in the top of the cap rock and prevents the sides from 
caving in. A six inch pipe is fitt ed through this oute rmost pipe and 
extends through the sulphur fonna tion and is set in the top of the under-
lying anhydrite or gypsum layer. 89 A three inch pipe is lowered through the 
six inch pipe and rests on a collar near t he bottom of the sulphur-
bearing rock. The annular space between the two pipes is seal ed by this 
collar. A one-inch air pipe runs down the center of the arrangememt and is 
located just above the collar. The six inch pipe i s perforated at two 
levels separated by the collar. Hot water i s ejected out the top set of 
holes while the liquified sulphur enters through the lower set of holes. 
The well is now steamed. 90 The wate r, before injection, is treated 
to destroy any salts which would fonn scales or corrosi ves that would .. 
damage the pipe. The water is hea ted to a temperature range between 320°-
32a 
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340°F. The water is then pumped under pressure of about 100-250 lb per in2 , 
and down through the annul ar space between the six inch and three inch pipe 
until it reaches the higher set of perforations in the six inch pipe,and 
flows •out into the sulphur bearing formation. This area is rai sed well 
beyond the sulphur's melting point. 91 
The heated zone takes the shape of an inverted cone where the outer 
limits remain below the fu sion point of sulphur, and the apex is at the 
bottom of the hole. The molten sulphur runs in the dome, and being hea vi er 
than water, sinks into a pool at the bottom of the well . The pressure 
within the dome forces the sulphur part way up the three inch pipe. 
Compressed air at 500 lb/i n2 is forced down the one inch pipe into the 
sulphur pool changing the specific gravity of the sulphur-water so lution 
so it flows up the three inch pipe, and is discharged into steam heated tanks 
where it is metered and the air is removed. The liquid sulphur is then 
transferred to vats to be stored as either a liquid or a solid. 92 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRASCH INDUSTRY 
The first Frasch mini ng operation was located in Calcasi eu Parish in 
southwest Louisiana; thirty-five miles north of the Gulf of Mexico and twenty 
miles east of the Texas border. The property consisted of a fifty-five acre 
mound of land gently rising from the surrounding swampland. 
The land was first investigated for oil because of conspicuous oil 
seepage observed at the surface. Drilling provided only small shows of oil, 
and the land was returned to its original owner for the development of sulphur 
production. Attempts were made to mine the dome by conventional shaft mining 
techniques. Forty years tran spired in which all attempts at direct sulphur 
mining failed. 
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The l ast attempt at conventional mining left the property i n the hands 
of the American Sulphur Company. Frasch and t he American Sulphur Company 
negotiated an agreement whereupon costs and profits would be shared fifty-
fifty upon the production of a sizable amount of sulphur whi ch would prove 
Frasch's process as commercially feasible. 
Frasch's initial well consisted of a ten-inch casi ng set in the cap 
rock above the sulphur. An eight - inch boreho l e extended byond t hi s casing, 
and through the sulphur bearing zone to its bottom. This borehole was fitted 
with a six- inch pipe perforated near its bottomtoallow the infl ux of melted 
sulphur. A top set of perforations were separated from the lower set by an 
iron ring inside the pipe whi ch could accept a two and a half inch nipple. 
These larger perforations _ allowed the hot water to flow out of the pipe. 
The final section of pipe was three inches in diameter and was set on the 
iron ring inside the six-inch casing. 
The original well was equipped with a conventiona l sucker rod which was 
placed inside the three-inch pipe at abo ut 175 feet. The sulphur deposit 
itself was located at about 623 feet. The water suppl ied by the surrounding 
swamp was super heated by steam provided by four one-hundred ho rse power 
boilers to a cylindrical steel heater, twenty feet high and thirty inches in 
diameter. The heater consi sted of a set of staggered cast iron pans which 
thoroughly heated the water. 93 The water was then gra vity fed to the well -
head. 
The well was steamed on Christmas Eve 1894 and twenty-four hours later 
produced sulphur to the jubiliation of Frasch and the twelve members of hi s 
crew. So much sulphur wa s extracted by the well that a pit was quickly dug 
adjacent to the drilling rig and l ined with wooden planks. Thi s was the 
first sulphur containment vat. 
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The pump began to fail after four hours of pumping, and on inspection 
of the steel sucker-rod it was found to have corroded away to almost nothing. 
Frasch returned to Cleveland to obtain a set of aluminum sucker- rods. Soon 
after he left, one of the boilers nearly exploded. The operation was quickly 
shut down, and the liquid sulphur solidified in the three-inch pipe due to 
the extended period of non -steaming. The crew was forced to tediously chip 
the sulphur away from the pipe in order to clear the pipe and raise it to the 
surface. This task was not completed until late fall. The well was then 
steamed again, and using the aluminum sucker- rods produced five hundred tons 
of sulphur. Finally, the aluminum sucker-rod snapped, temporarily halting 
the opera ti on. 
Frasch observed, due to the boiler accident, that millions of qallons of 
water ~ould be needed for a successful comnerical operation. 94 He instructed 
his superintendent of fi eld onerations , Jacob C. Hcffman, ·to dig an eight -mile 
canal to the Houston River to obtain this plentiful supply of water. Four new 
150 horsepower boilers were also to be delivered. 
Frasch next went to New York to renegotiate with Hewitt and Cooper of 
the American Sulphur Company. They agreed that five hundred tons of sulphur 
proved the Frasch process a success. This led to the incorporation of the 
Union Sulphur Company in the state of ·New Jersey on Janaury 23, 1896. 95 The 
company obtained all property and mineral rights at the location, now named 
Sulphur Mine, and also the Frasch patents. The company was divided equally 
between the shareholders of the American Sulphur Company and Frasch, Squire 
(the secretary of Standard Oil) and Frank Rockefeller. 96 
Frasch returned to Cleveland to work out the problems of raising the 
sulphur to the surface . He realized the sucker-rod failure would be a constant 
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problem to a commercial venture. He knew that liquid sulphur has a density of 
1.811 grams per cubic centimeter. Frasch concluded that pumping compressed air 
into the liquid sulphur and filling 'it \' 1ith air bubbles would suffic iently reduce 
the sulphur's density below the surrounding groundwater outside t he three-inch 
pipe. The greater hydrostatic pressure on the outside of the pipe would force 
the column of sulphur to the surface. The air would be delivered t o the 
sulphur column at a depth of from fifty to one hundred feet by being forced 
down the center of the three-inch pipe. A constant level of sulphur must also 
stand in the pipe at all times for this process to work efficiently. A 
continuous supply of liquid sulphur was required to maintain thi s level. 
Frasch also knew that the temperature in side the cap rock must be 
carefully controlled to maintain a continuous supply of sulphur at the bottom 
of the well. Sulphur melts at approximately 114°C and becomes a thin and runny 
yellow liquid. The liquid becomes thick and brown at 150°c and is too viscous 
for pumping at this temperature, and at 220°c the sulphur becomes almost 
plastic and is far too viscous to be pumped to the su rface. 97 
The temperature must first be controlled by pumping the correct amount of 
water at the right temperature into the cap rock. The thermal conductivity of 
the cap rock is important in effecting the temperature within the cap rock. 
Frasch found that a fissurous and cavernous cap rock would allow the hot water 
to flow randomly through the cap rock, and away from the well causi ng 
inefficient production of sulphur. Frasch' s so lution to thi s problem was the 
pumping of mud down the well to fill these cavit ies. The other factor affect ing 
thennal efficiency was the over abundant quantity of cold water i:nside the cap 
rock which would dillute the heating efficiency of the hot water. Frasch 
devised a method of drilling bleed wells adjacent to the production wells to 
drain off this cold water. 98 
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Frasch also set up hi s new wells to deliver water to both the bottom 
and top of the sulphur deposit by pumping hot water down both the ten-i nch 
and six-inch pipes. This al so increased the speed at whi ch the sulphur melted . 
This double discharge system provided thorough heat ing of the sulphur 
deposit. 99 Hot water provi ded onl y at the top of the deposit will f l oat on 
top of any cold water present in the cap rock. The melted sulphur wi l l sink 
down through thecoldwater as i t i s heavier than the water, and solidify as it 
passes through this cold wat er. Hot water discharged at t he bottom of the 
sulphur deposit will rise through the cold water, lose its heat, and subsequently 
lose its heating capacity. The '. double discharge system eliminates bot h of 
these disadvantages. 
Frasch also took measures t o insure the non-solidifi cation of sulphur in 
the production pipe if the well again had to be 11 cooled 11 • He first shortened 
the bottom strainer to prevent a freeze in the sulphur line. He t hen devi sed 
a system to pull the six-inch pi pe well up into the derri ck while hot wat er 
was still being pumped down t he well to keep the sulphur i n the pipe me lted 
even as it reached the surface . 
The Sulphur Mine operat ion , in total, was unprofita bl e for the early 
part of its operation due to irregular production and t he high cost of f uel. 
The operation was actually forced to shut down for a shor t period as Frasch 
searched for additional funds . He received these funds f rom Hewitt and Cooper 
after considerable stalling from both men. Three addit i onal wells were drill ed 
by January 10, 1901, but produced only 3114 tons of sulphur. 
The whole operation was saved by the discovery of great quantit i es of 
oil at the Spindletop dome in east Texas only sixty mi les west of Sul phur Mine. 
This fuel oil replaced the expensive Alabama coal which Frasch had been forced 
to use up until this time. The fuel oil only cost 60¢ a barrel on deli very t o 
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Sulphur Mine, and through the utilization of this cheap energy so urce 
production rose from 3078 long tons in 1901 to 218,950 tons in 1905 with an 
increase from two wells to nineteen wells. 
The Sicilian sulphur industry was Frasch's only direct competition during 
this period of production, and up until the advent of the Union Sulphur 
Company it was the sole possessor of the native sulphur market. They had for 
years been plagued by mismanagement and high Italian and local taxes. However, 
at this time the industry had been stabilized by a group of British alkali 
manufacturers. 
The Anglo-Sicilian cooperative undercut Union Sulphur prices in the 
United States by selling their sulphur just above cost. Frasch felt threatened 
by this activity, and clearly stated he intended to keep the American market. 
They continued to ignore Frasch, so he invaded the European market . He 
successfully won a considerable part of the market away from the Anglo-Sicilian 
co~pany. lOO The final product of the Frasch invasion was the dissolution of 
the Anglo-Sicilian company. 
The withdrawal of the English, and declining sales spawned mass unemp loy-
ment throughout the Sicilian sulph ur industry. This led to rioting by the 
unemployed workers. The Italian government was forced to nationalize the 
industry in order to stabili ze the industry once again. This was done by the 
formation of the Compulsory Consortium for the Sicilian Sulphur Industry ,lOl 
and the nationalization of the Sicilian industry was the first attempt by any 
nation to valorize a domestic commodity on a world level. 
The Italian management of the Sicilian industry was far from perfect. 
The government set up a poor system of issuing warrants to producers for their 
deliveries of sulphur. Many times there were no buyers for the su lphur or the 
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price of the warrants would not be matched by the buyers. Meanwhile, the 
producers would cash their hi gh value warrants at Italian banks; robbing the 
government of revenue. The government reduced the warrant value to a low 
amount which caused hardship for the producers. At best this method of 
financial transaction was a temporary cure for the Sicilian industry. The 
single real positive aspect of the nationalization was that the Italians now 
could negotiate on a one to one basis with the Union Sulphur Company. 102 
The two factions battl ed with each other until 1908 when an agreement 
was struck, dividingtheworld market into thirds. The Italians were to receive 
2/3 of the market while the American company was to receive 1/3 of the market. 
The United States market was excluded from this world market and tacitly left 
in the hands of the Ameri cans. The agreement was to last till the Consortium's 
dissolution in 1918. Prices were set at $22 a long ton upon delivery, and $18 
domestically. All went well until 1912. 
Woodrow Wilson then passed the famous "Five Sisters Act" in which one 
clause disallowed a New Jersey company to hold any legal contracts with a 
foreign country. Frasch was forced to break his agreement with the Italian 
government. The two industries were again on their own. 
The Union Sulphur Company increased its production from 220,000 long tons 
in 1905 to a total of 787,735 long tons in 1912. 103 Frasch marketed his 
sulphur to all buyers for the same constant and open price. He kept the 
price reasonable, and was always looking for new markets applicable to sulphur 
and aided in research in inventing new sulphur using processes. The Sicilians 
were often cheaper, but their delivery was sporadic and many times short as 
noguarartees on weights were made by the Italian government. These practices 
made Frasch's sulphur a good buy. 
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While the Union Sulphur Company was busily competing with the Sicilian 
industry for the world sulphur trade, a new company was developing in east 
Texas. The location was at the mouth of the Brazos River flowing into the Gulf 
of Mexico. The mound had first been investigated for oil by the famous 
Colonel Lucas in 1901. He abandoned the project because of excess H2S gas 
and dry holes. 
Henry Straiti appeared in 1906, and finding sulphur in test wells, 
enlisted the aid of a Houston financier named George Hamman. Hamman in turn 
sought out Edward F. Simms who convinced the Texas Company to invest $100,000 
in exploration of Bryanmound. Sulphur was found, but no oil and the Texas 
Company withdrew from the venture. Hamman and Simms then formed the Gulf 
Development Company and bought more leases in 190'8. They continued their 
drilling and completed twenty-seven test wells all showing sulphur and proving 
300 acres of the mound. This convinced Hamman and Simms, who picked up the 
purchase options on the rest of the Bryanmound area. 
More investors were attracted to Bryanmound because of the success seen 
at Sulphur Mine. The most influential of these investors in the formulation 
of the Freeport Sulphur Company, and the development of Bryanmound was Erick 
P. Swenson, a Texas turned New York City financier. Swenson was instrumental 
in obtaining more investors for the Bryanmound project. The Vanderlip-Swenson-
Tilghman Syndicate was formed, and negotiated the formulation of a new sulphur 
company with Simms and Hamman. The Freeport Sulphur Company was incorporated 
in Texas on July 12, 1912. 104 
The Freeport company obtained all the sulphur property, and also won a 
court battle with the Union Sulphur Company over infringement of patent rights. 
The Freeport Townsite Company also came into being to build a city on the west 
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side of the Brazos (this city was also the brainchild of Eric P. Swenson). 
The Freeport Sulphur Company was to have an operating sulphur extraction plant 
by June 1, 1913. 
The construction of the sulphur operation, and the town of Freeport 
developed quickly, despite transportation and labor obstacles. Three wells 
were drilled while construction took place, all of which produced quantities 
of hydrogen sulphide gas sometimes blowing craters in the mound and destroying 
the drilling. However, on November 12, 1912 the work was finished and using 
the Frasch process sulrhurwas flowing by 5:00 p.m.,and presented Texas with 
its first production of sulphur. 
The Big Hill salt dome in Matagorda County was the next sulphur laden 
dome to be brought into production. The mound here is 4000 feet long and 2400 
feet wide and only twenty feet above the marsh surface. The mound was first 
explored for oil, and modestly produced oil for a short period of time in 1904. 
Sa 1t water soon appeared in a 11 existing wells, and production fe 11 off to 400 
barrels a day forcing the exodus of all oil men by 1905. 
A group of St. Louisian men spurred the exploration of the dome for 
sulphur interested by the shows reported by oil drillers. They organized the 
Gulf Sulphur Company with several Texas associates, and began further explora-
tory drilling. The St. Loui s men found a sulphur operation to be a costlier 
venture than they planned, and were glad to have an associate of the Bryan-· 
mound developers, Spencer C. Browne, examine thelr property in the hone of 
obtaining additional funds from the Bryanmound-New York backers. 
Browne reported to his associates that Big Hill was as promising a find 
as Bryanmound. Two of these associates, Seeley W. Mudd and Bernard Baruch 
\'tent east and convinced J. P. Morgan to invest in Big Hill. 
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The Gulf Sulphur Companyr.ow came under control of Baruch and Mudd . Mudd 
was elected president and purchased the dome area. The devel opment of the 
mound's sulphur potentials was put in the hands of W. T. Lundy , a young 
consulting engineer from San Franci sco. 
However, the development of the Big Hil l mound was del ayed by the first 
World War. The government needed a l arge supply of sulphur fo r t he production 
of sulphuric acid for use in the manufacture of muniti ons. Unfortunat ely, 
contracts to industry were only awarded to those who could guarantee delivery 
of their product. The investors were unagreeable to guarantee the delivery of 
sulphur to the government from thei r unproven dome. 
The war was a boon to both the Freeport and Un ion Sulphur Companies. 
The demand called for full and unl imited production by bot h compani es. 105 The 
munitions industry demanded pure and high strength su lphuri c acid whi ch could 
only be produced by the contact method utilizing nati ve sulphur and not pyrites. 
The statistical breakdown of the two American companies at t he beginning 
of the war was as follows: 106 
combined stocks 
year's proj ected production 
Freeport 
~ioo 
holes drilled 
Freeport 
~ioo 
Reserves 
Bryanmound 
Sulphur Mine 
Total 
Production Facilit ies 
1,440 ,000 ton s 
1,400,000 ton s 
500,000 tons 
900, 000 t ons 
124 
600 
2,675 ,000 tons 
4, 706, 000 tons 
7,281,000 long t ons 
Freeport 3 powe r pl ants 
power rating 23,800 hp 
heating capacity 8,000,000 gall ons of water 
boilers are operated at 150-175% of their rat ing 
24 hours a day and steam six wells 
daily producti on: 1,500 tons 
Union 
power rating 
8 power plants 
21,480 hp 
6 power plants 
power rating 16,230 hp 
boilers are operated at 150% of their rating 
24 hours a day and steam seven wells 
daily production: 2,500 tons 
Each company burned approximately 4,000 barrelsoffuel a day. Freeport 
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purchased oil from Mexico while Union purchased Mexican, Louisi ana, and Texas 
oil. 
The only major production , problem which developed during this wartime 
period was the three week shutdown of the Sulphur Mine operation due to its 
destruction caused by a cyclone. Stockpiles filled t he gap of this lost 
production, but the margin of safety was cut to a dangerous level . The 
government at this time looked for the Big Hill operation to fill the gap of 
needed sulphur. 
Construction of Big Hill began August 13, 1918 and was completed on March 
15, 1919 when production began. lOl This was four months after the end of World 
War I. , The site became known as the Gulf location and was extremely 
successful due to a tight formationof unconsolidated sediments overlying the 
cap rock. This formation correlated with the loose gravels and quicksands 
found at Sulphur Mine. This tighter formation disallowed the escape of much 
more water than at Sulphur Mine and Bryan Mound which was plagued with a great 
amount of cavity and fissure area and cold water. The greater thermal efficiency 
of Big Hill reduced the amount of hot water required to produce a ton of sulphur 
(the water ratio) compared to the other two domes. Production was expected to 
be only 1000 tons a day, but while still using t he 1000-ton equipment the Gulf 
site was able to produce 4000 tons a day. The total production from Big Hill's 
lifetime was 12,346,000 tons of sulphur. 
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The war's ending brought a crisis to the industry of overproduction. 
Union and Freeport stockpiles were in the million range, there was an over-
abundance of sulphuric acid and sulphur chemicals, and the government had a 
surplus of 150 million pounds of oleum and sulphur itself. Industrial activity 
was down, and farmers had planted fewer crops needing less fertilizer. 
The markets demanding Frasch sulphur were basically the rubber and paper 
industries. The other markets were being shared by abundant pyrite supplies, 
sulphur recovered from metallurgical processes, and from petroleum and gas 
refining techniques (sludge acid). 
The Union Sulphur Company already was established in the market. Frasch 
was able to sell to large industrial consumers , chemical jobbers, and sulphur 
refiners who made the "flowers of sulphur" popular with the producers of 
powdered sulphur produced for the spraying of vineyard crops. He stated one 
open price F.O.B. (producer pays transport costs) plant in carloads, his 
minimum sales unit. 
Free po rt , who had to break-into the market, employed the services of 
Parsons and Petit of New York. They were experienced chemical merchants who 
had dealt with Sicilian sulphur in the past, and had a quantity of contracts 
with various buyers already established. 
Texas Gulf's entry saw their president, Walter H. Aldridge, as hoping 
to displace pyrites from the fertilizer industry. He employed the H. J. Baker 
and Brothers brokerage firm to build up a client list, and later instituted 
his own sales force. 
Domestic and imported pyrites were able to undercut the price of American 
sulphur from 1919-1926. However, in 1925 native sulphur accounted for 68% of 
the market where as pyrites accounted for only 19% of the market. 107 The 
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contact process was important in fixing the price of sulphur, and demanded the 
pure Frasch sulphur over sulphur refined from pyrites. 
The foreign market was again invaded, and this time by all three American 
companies. The Sicilians were determined to hold on to the European market. 
They made a firm agreement with the National Sulphuric Acid Association of 
London, which was Europe's largest consumer of sulphur from 1922-1925, and 
also reduced prices for all their customers in general. 
The American companies sought to establish a workable agreement with the 
Sicilian industry in order to divide the world market between them in a 
suitable fashion. These negotiations were hampered at first by the American 
companies acting as individual interests instead of as a single entity. The 
companies formed the Sulphur Export Corporation, known as Sulexco, under the 
Webb-Pomerene Act. 108 This act allowed American companies to unite for 
bargaining in foreign markets, and solved the problem of dispersed negotiations 
with the Sicilians. 
An agreement was finally reached between the two factions which guaranteed 
135,000 tons of trade to the Sicilian industry. 109 The world market was then 
divided in such a manner as to give Sul exco 75% of the world market and the 
Consortium 25%. The low American prices in North America stopped Italy from 
entering North American markets, and no American sulphur entered Italy due to 
a national law barring any importation of foreign sulphur. Minimum prices 
were to be agreed upon yearly, and the agreement lasted until 1934. 
The domestic market saw healthy growth in the 1920's. The paper, 
insecticide, and rubber industries grew enormously. Sulphuric acid manufacturers 
switched to purer Frasch sulphur as the acid consuming petroleum and fertilizer 
industries expanded andthechemical industry demanded more sulphuric acid as 
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new products were invented (such as rayon, plastics, and refrigeration). The 
yea r 1929 saw 70.8% of all sulphuric acid being made from 1,135,000 tons of 
Frasch sulphur. The sulphite paper pulp industry had also doubled. This 
greatly increased demand for Frasch sulp hur brought about the further 
exploration of untested domes by the .American industry. 
The Union Sulphur Company investigated four domes from 1920-1922. One 
was at Pal angana near the Mexican border in Texas, and another which they 
optioned the sulphur rights to in 1922 was Damon Mound. 
Damon Mound proved to be unprofitable for the company after some fffty-
two test well s had been drilled. The only good deposit amounted to less than 
120 acres. Union decided to abandon the mound. 
Big Creek was the next dome investigated. Union set up production here, 
but was able to produce only 1070 tons of sulphur from six well s. Twelve 
other domes were explored of which none were steamed. 
Union' s Sulphur Mine operation was closed down on December 23, 1924. It 
had produced 9.4 million tons of sulphur during its operational lifetime. The 
company was abl e to sell from stockpiles for three years, but they were no 
longer a producing factor in the industry. 
The salt domes of Louisiana and Texas which showed any promise of sulphur 
were all explored. Unfortunately, of the more than 200 salt domes in the area, 
only 24 domes ever produced sulphur and by 1958 half of these had been 
abandoned. 109 
The big find of the 1920's was at Hoskins Mound in Brazoria County, Texas. 
The Producer 's Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Texas Company was drilling for 
oil under the guidance of chief geologist E. G. Woodruff. Hi s idea was to 
drill deeply on the flanks of the dome. 110 The third well they drilled on t he 
south flank found a sulphur bearing formation 200 feet thick. The find was 
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ignored , and not until Texas Company No. 10 was drilled did the company take 
notice. 
The Texas Company was inexperienced with sulphur deposits so they called 
in the expert, Spencer Browne. He in turn called in Lundy from San Francisco. 
A sulphur survey was taken, and a report turned into the Texas Company. The 
Texas Company was interested in mining the su lphur themselves, but preferred 
to sell the property to either Texas Gulf or Freeport. 
Freeport purchased the Texas Company lease solely for the production of 
sulphur. Construction of the plant was begun, and the operation was assigned 
a deadline for the production of sulphur of one year. The Texas weather and 
labor probl ems hindered the mine 1 s construct ion. However, sulphur flowed on 
March 31, 1923 a day before the deadline date. 
The pl ant was built 2000 feet off the ground to defeat subs idence which 
had been a problem at the Sulphur Mine operation. Every mine had improved 
in technology and working efficiency from the beginning at Sulphur Mine. 
Hoskins wa s no exception with an 8400 hp boiler that could develop 50% over-
load and a gravity canal extending from Bastrop Bayou which provided 280 
million gallons of viater to reservoirs, a three-r10nth 1 s suprly. 
The mound at first refused to produce economic sulphur. The sa lt dome 
is small, and there are large boulders in the overlying sand and unconsolidated 
sediments which hamper the successful drilling of the dome. Drilling was 
further slowed by the 100 foot overlying cap rock which i s very hard and 
dense. Finally, the richest sulphur deposits are found on the south and east 
flanks (not on top), and are located at a depth of 2000 feet. 
The cap rock, once penet rated, was found to be cavernous and allowed the 
hot water to migrate to the center of the do~e. A successful mudding operation 
was developed to fill the major cavities inside the dome. The t herma l 
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efficiency of the dome was brought to a normal level and subsequently producti on. 
Expected subsidence did not appear in the dome. This subsidence is 
depended on to close the caviti es created by sulphur extraction. The closing 
of thes e cavities is necessary to make the next well thermally efficient. 
Nitroglycerine was exploded to induce subsidence, but finally subsidence 
naturally occurred. The thermal efficiency of the Hoskins location became 
very good, and the dome became a good sulphur producer. 
The next property explored for sulphur was located in Whart on County, 
Texas. The dome was proven on August 31, 1923 with shows of both sulphur and 
oil. Exploratory drilling determined the sulphur deposit to cover about 1500 
acres on the eastern and southern slopes of the dome. The cap rock contained 
as high as fifty percent sulphur in places, and the thicknesses someti mes 
were in excess of 200 feet. 
The purchase of leases and thi s exploratory drilling extended over a 
period of approximately five years. The construction of the plant did not 
begin until May 31, 1928. It was an enormous project because of the extensive 
area of the sulphur deposi t , and because of the individual leases which 
required a separate operation be applied to each lease. Usually a deposit is 
mined by a tight concentration of wells beginning at the highest point of 
the sulphur bearing area and travelling down the side of the dome. Subsidence 
then naturally closes the cavities caused by the sulph ur extraction. This 
method can only be followed if the property is owned in total or if the 
individual leases are pool ed together. This pooling was accomplished for 
about half the leases, but t he other half still required separate operation .111 
It was determined that eight million gallons of water would be necessary 
to steam the wells over every 24 hour period. The main water supply was 
nearby the San Bernard River. Well water high in bicarbonate of soda was 
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added to the surface water provi ding the 11 soda 11 for the process of l ime-soda 
softening which protected t he pipes from corrosion and scal ing. 
The power plant was locat ed away from the dome to be unaffected by 
subsidence. Superheated wate r, steam, and compressed air l ines totaled 
90,000 feet in main feed l ength and 26,000 feet in secondary pipe . The sulphur 
production lines including steam l ines to prevent freez ing reached 80,000 feet 
in total length. 112 
The Boling Dome was the fir st operation located i nl and from t he open 
ocean. This forced the bl eed water from the operation t o be aereated and 
settled before it could be returned to the San Bernard River below t i dewater 
where the river was already sa l t y. 
The town of Newgulf grew up al ongside the sulphur operation. It became 
a complete and modern community without company ownershi p of any of the 
business establishments. It i s a thriving community as i s t he who l e of 
l~harton County thanks to the increased tax revenue produced by the Bol ing Dome 
sulphur operation. 
The Boling Dome became the l argest producer of su lphur found i n t he 
industry, and had produced 50 mill ion tons of sulphur by January 1958 which 
accounted for about 38% of total Frasch sulphur product ion. 115 Bol i ng was 
still producing 1.5 million long t ons a year in 1978. 
The Texas Gulf Company al so developed a small deposit at Long Poi nt , 
approximately twelve miles northeast of Boling. A singl e we ll was steamed, 
and produced 402,000 tons of sul phur from March 19, 1930 t o October 19, 1938. 116 
A new company arose from the development of another small depos i t 
located between Corpus Chri sti and Laredo. The dome, named Palangana, was 
investigated by J. W. Cain and A. H. Smith who obtained good shows of sulphur. 
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They decided to develop the south Texas dome on their own after both Union 
and Texas Gulf rejected the opportunity to develop the dome. Cain and 
Smith organized the Duval Texas Sul phur Company. The small pl ant was operated 
efficiently, and produced 237,689 tons of sulphur from early 1928 until the 
spring of 1935. 117 
Duva 1 a 1 so purchased a b 1 ock of 1 eases <:>n the Bo 1 i ng Dome through a 
royalty agreement with Texas Gulf. Duval began steami ng the wel l in 1935 
and extracted 571,237 tons of sulphur before closure in 1940. 118 
Duval also explored the Orchard dome for sulphur between 1929 and 1930. 
Their initial investigations found no corrmercial deposits on the top of the 
cap, but Gulf Oil discove red sulphur on the flanks of the dome. Duval wa s 
then successful in locating good deposits along these flanks. These deposits 
were discovered in the hollows of step faults in the overhanging limestone 
some 1200 to 2500 feet deep, or in narrow structures between faults at depths 
between 2500 to 4000 feet. 119• Sulphur was found in t he sa lt , or in one 
pocket on top of another whi ch required two wells to be operated simultaneously, 
one directly over the other. Steaming began in 1938. 
This structure provided deposits of both large and sma ll quanti ty, and 
became a very profitabl e reserve for the new Duval company, as i t had 
produced 3,735,000 tons of sulphur by 1958. 
The Jefferson Lake Oil Company was exploring salt dome property back in 
Louisiana during this time of development in Texas. Their activity was 
concentrated on 2500 acres of land surrounding the Jefferson Island sa lt dome. 
This land was leased from the Louisiana state government with a one-eighth 
royalty to be paid the state on any oil, gas, or mineral resource di scovered. 
The company spent about a million doll ars exploring for oil and came up dry 
on every hole. However, in their last try they discovered a good show of 
sulphur beneath Lake Peigneur. 120 
Jefferson Lake leased the property to the American Cyanamid Company 
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which withdrew after six months of attempted development. Jefferson Lake 
then went into the sulphur business, and became the Jefferson Lake Sulphur 
Company. Jefferson Lake successfully developed the Lake Peigneur property, 
but produced only a marginal 426,235 tons between October 18, 1932 and June 
1936. 
They next explored the Clemens Dome located in Brazoria County , Texas 
near the San Bernard River. Jefferson Lake's exploration began on September 
21, 1936, and ·ithrough drilling had outlined the sulphur deposit within two 
months. The entire Lake Peigneur plant was then dismant l ed, moved, and 
reassembled at the Clemens site. Sulphur production began on April 27, 1937 
and continued for five years. The operation was now concentrated on t he lower 
end of the dome, and it appeared a good mudding operation was needed for 
continued production. Duval and Freeport generously al lowed Harold Jaquet, 
J ff L k I f • 1 d • t d t t • t th • dd • t • 121 e erson a e s 1e super1n en en , o 1nspec eir mu 1ng opera i ons . 
A suitable mudding operation was then employed at the Clemens site and 
production rose again to acceptable levels in 1942. The dome had produced 
a total of 2,626,130 tons by December 1, 1956. 
Jefferson Lake also developed an operation at Long Point with half of 
its production guaranteed to Texas Gulf, the provider of the leases. The 
plant steamed their wells with a 3,380,000 gallon a day capacity. The 
operation produced 2,396,000 long tons of sulphur from June 7, 1946 until 
1957, and was still producing 400,000 long tons of sulphur a year as of 1978. 
The Grand Ecaille dome located thirty-five miles south of New Orleans 
and ten miles southwest of the Mississippi River became Freeport's next site 
of sulphur extraction. 122 The cap rock area covers about 1100 acres and 
averages 250 feet in thickness beginning at 1250 feet below the surface. 
The overlying formation consists of sand and unconsolidated sediments. 
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A ten mile long canal was dug from the Mi ssissipp i River to the wellsite 
to provide 2,000,000 gallons of water to steam the wells every 24 hours. A 
shipping terminal and headquarters for the operation were also established 
next to the river. 
The plant itself was constructed upon 18,000 pilings supported by a 
concrete mat. The plant floor was rai sed eleven feet above the water's 
surface. All permanent buildings were constructed of steel and engineered 
to survive 125 mile per hour winds. 
The power plant consisted of six 860 hp. Sterling boilers which were 
able to use gas, oil, or pulverized coal. Three 750-kilowatt noncondensing 
turbine generators provided current for all the necessary operations found 
on the plant. Three 800-pound high-press ure compressors supplied the air 
for pumping sulphur. Steam used for auxilliary mechanisms (generators, 
corrpressors, pumps) was returned to the hot-water system by low-pressure 
heaters and water treating plants. This steam provided approximately 30% of 
all heat being applied to the sulphur deposit. The operation showed 
considerable improvement over Herman Frasch' s original operation of four 
decades earlier. 
The Grand Ecaille dome was plagued by a cavernous cap rock st ructure 
similar to Hoskins Mound. Dredged material was used as the raw material in 
the mudding operation to cure the thermal deficiency. 
The Grand Ecaille dome presented the Freeport people with a new 
problem; first appearance of "off-color sulphur11 due to traces of crude oil 
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in the mineral. The probl em was solved by Freeport's devel opment of a 
distillation process which removes the unwanted oil from t he sulphur, and 
turns the sulphur into 11 bri ght sul phur". This problem has arisen in sa lt 
domes in Louisiana and Mexi co , and is handled by different refinery techniques 
of the individual producer or so ld as off-color sulphur and refined by t he 
buyer. 
Freeport was hesitant in opening its operation at the Grand Ecai ll e 
location due to Governor Huey Long's administration and i ts tax policy. The 
tax policy began with an ad valorem tax on the estimated si ze of any mineral 
deposit. The estimation of a sul phur deposit in a Frasch operation cannot 
be done vi sually as no man can descend to the su lphur deposit for its vis ual 
inspection. It is also evi dent that a sulphur deposit can be quite irregul ar 
within a cap rock structure . The sulphur once melted hopefu l ly flows to the 
pool area. It may also mi grate to any part of the dome where gravity mig ht 
take it, and be frozen in an unmi nable fissure forever . Bryanmound is a good 
example of a poor estimati on of a sulphur deposit. The estimate was 
seventeen million tons, but in reality only five million tons were produced. 123 
Therefore, the estimation of a su l phur deposi t is a very cr ude and "bli nd" 
figure. 
Taxes levied against Frasch sulphur also are unfai r due to the uneq ual 
representation it receives i n the state legislature. Only si x counties in. 
Texas produce sulphur out of a total of 254 counties. State severance taxes 
reflected this prejudice as t hey have always been considerably higher t han 
those levied against other mineral s (for example in 1936 t he sulphur tax was 
. 3 
8% of value as compared to t he oi l tax which was 24% of val ue ) . An ad 
valorem tax, which remains on t he sulphur year after year as l ong as the 
sulphur remains unsold, and federal and local taxes increase the fina l tax 
54 
bill to over six dollars a ton. 124 
Union Sulphur Company ended its operations due to the ad valorem tax 
either because it was paying on 1,000,000 tons of sulphur which did not exi st 
or, if it actually existed, becaus e production was out-balanced by the tax. _ 
Louisiana groups interested in the industrialized growth of the states , 
such as the New Orleans Association of Commerce, did not want a sit uation of 
this sort to arise again. A ceiling was put on the ad valorem tax limiting 
it to twice the property value of the plant's location. They also pushed for 
legislation that would bring the stature of sulphur in line with that of oil 
and ~as. Oil and gas taxes could not be raised or newly imposed on rights, 
leases or on property which contained oil and gas. The legislature agreed to 
this proposition and Freeport began construction of its Grand Ecaille plant. 
The legislature then proceeded to raise the severance tax to $2.00 a 
ton, 77 cents above the Texas severance tax. Texas production correspondingly 
increased while Louisiana production correspondingly decreased. Fortunately, 
the severance tax was brought to parity with the Texas tax due to the work 
of the Louisiana State Board of Commerce and Industry during the Governor 
Leche administration. 
The final tax battle was begun by E'arl Long when he took office eighteen 
years after his brother's departure. Earl proposed a $3.00 a ton severance 
tax which would have cost Freeport four million dollars a year in taxes . A 
large publicity campaign was put forth by Freeport to defeat the proposed law 
labeled House Bill 671. The campaign drew support from the people and press 
of Louisiana, and from the sulphur dependent industrial interests outside of 
the state. House Bil 1 671 and all its amended vers i ans which reduced the tax 
down to $2. 00 a ton were defeated. The $1. 03 a ton severance tax remained 
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intact as well as Freeport's competitive standing in the industry. These 
events came near the beginning of World War II. 
World War II brought an increased demand for sulphur similar to that 
of World War I, as well as the end of agreements between Sulexco and the 
Italian sulphur industry. The Gulf coast companies responded by producing 
a million more tons a year . Their stockpiles were also reduced by a half a 
million tons a year. 
The postwa r era saw a boom in chemical activity as industry and technology 
expanded. The Korean War brought an even greater demand for sulphur than 
World War II, resulting in an increase of production of a million tons a year. 
The demand outstripped production, and reduced stockpi l es from 3.5 million 
tons in 1945 to 2.7 million tons in 1950, a quantity of only six months supply. 
This demand caused a shortage of sulphur in 1950 which was not long lived, 
but resulted in a more intensive search for sulphur across the world. The 
advent of synthetic materi als such as fibers, rubbers, plastics and resins, . 
gum and waxes, dyes and scents, detergents and lubricants, and others have 
greatly increased the demand for sulphur, and the subsequent search for new 
sulphur deposits. 
Sulphuric acid consumption rose from 4.8 million tons in 1939 to 8.17 
mi 11 ion tons in 1945. The demand for sulphur jumped from 2. 5 to 3. 8 mi 11 ion 
tons during 1940-1945 with 712,000 tons a year going to our allies which 
equalled about one-third more than our pre-war exports. 
The fertilizer industry expanded from8.2 million tons in 1940 to 18.0 
million tons in 1950. Thederr.and on H2so4 was increased by 3.33 million tons 
in the production of super-phosphate and ammonium sulphate for these 
fertilizers. The fertilizer industry not only received increased demand at 
home, but also from the new consumptionofthe underdeveloped countries. 
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The American chemical industry increased its consumption of sulphuric 
acid from 0.6 million tons to 3.8 million tons between 1939 to 1951. The 
growth of the synthetic fiber industry brought a great new demand for 
sulphuric acid with the rayon industry bringing about an increase in demand 
of 4,350,000 tons sulphuric acid by itself. The products such as pigments , 
synthetic rubber, and petrochemicals (plastics) also increased the demand 
for sulphuric acid. The demand equalled 4,350,000 tons of sulphuric ac id 
by 1956 in the chemical industry opposed to 682,000 tons in 1925. 
Direct use of sulphur was increased in the paper pulp process where 
demand increased half over its pre-1940 demand. There was an increase in 
demand for carbonibisulphide in aluminum manufacture, and for the vul cani zation 
of natural and synthetic rubber. 
Sulphur stockpiles decreased after the war with continued demand from 
Europe. Sulphur was used by the western European countries to bui ld-up 
munition supplies in order to strengthen their military posture opposing the 
communist bloc. The greatest reason for the shortage of sulphur whi ch 
developed was the Korean War. 
Texas Gulf and Freeport remedied the shortage by reducing suppli es to 
domestic consumers by 80-85% in 1951. Exports were put on allotments 
causing protests by the importing countries throughout the world . These 
actions were initiated by the National Production Authority. 125 Other actions 
of the NPA were limits on consumption by small users in the U.S., and on the 
inventories they could hold . 
The exploration for increased sulphur production by various means was 
undertaken to a greater extent. Surface deposits were mined in the United 
States and overseas. Overseas pyrite production was al so increased. The 
United States and Canada recovered more sulphur from sour natural gas, 
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refinery gases, and from smelter gases. 126 A sulphuric acid production 
process using gypsum as raw material was devised in Gennany. The search for 
new Frasch domes in Texas, Louisiana, and Mexico successfully provided the 
most substantial supply of sulphur. 
The Jefferson Lake operation at Starks in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana 
began processi ng on June 25, 1951. This was the first operation to begin after 
the Korean War. The property had been released to the Jefferson Lake Company 
by Texas Gulf who was busy developing the Moss Bluff, Spindletop, and Worland 
domes. The negotiation was as usual a royalty agreement. 
The sulphur was extracted from the lower edges of the dome. The plant 
handled 1.5 million gallons of water a day, and produced 39,488 tons of 
sulphur (in six months of 1951). The output was increased to 110,528 tons 
in 1955. 
Texas Gulf's development was planned to begin in 1939. A series of 
economic circumstances (i.e. the Great Depression), and then the military 
closing of the plant assembly during World War II to divert its machinery 
and manpower to other needy sectors delayed further development. The 
construction of their Moss Bluff operation began in 1947, and the plant was 
producing by June 24, 1948. The dome produced 2,613,747 long tons of sulphur 
up through the end of 1957. 
Spindletop was brought into production on May 12, 1952 after forty-two 
exploratory wells had outlined the sulphur deposit in 1950. The plant was 
also designed to accommodate the previously existing city of Beaumont, Texas. 
The total output was 2,110,000 long tons of sulphur through 1957, produced 
by the 4,000,000 gallon pe~ day plant. 
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The Hoskins Mound Freeport facilities were closed after thirty-two years 
of operation in May 1955. The plant had produced 11,000,000 tons of sulphur 
over its lifetime. Freeport now investigated Garden Island Bay at the mouth 
of the Mississippi River in extreme southeast Plaquemines Parish, Bay St. 
Elaine on the Gulf 100 miles westward, Lake Pelto in central Plaquemines 
Parish, and an unprosperous venture at Dog Lake in Central Terrebonne Parish. 
Garden Island Bay had fonTJerly been explored for oil by the Texas Company 
fromwhomFreeport attained the rights to the four domes. The sulphur company 
then located brimstone in 1200 acres of cap rock at a depth of 1600 to 1700 
feet. 
This plant was also built on a concrete mat on which were positioned 
2260 pilings. The plant was raised sixteen feet above the marshy surface to 
avoid the spring floods. The plant had a 3.5 million gallon a day water 
capacity, but usually steamed ten to twelve wells at three million gallons 
a day. A billion and a half gallon reservoir was constructed on 600 acres 
of marshland. There were no vats at Garden Island Bay as the molton sulphur 
was transferred directly to "hot barges", and then shipped to Port Sulphur 
for distribution. The plant began production on November 19, 1953, and had 
produced 2 ,318,000 tons through 1957. 
Bay St. Elaine, another near shore dome was brought into production on 
November 19, 1952. This plant was not built on a concrete mat and pilings, 
but was a floatinq structure ~mich was anchored at the site. The plant was 
equipped with five gas-fired boilers, and produced 2,000,000 gallons of 
super-heated water daily. This was also the first plant to use seawater in the 
mining process, and utilized a softening process which successfully eliminated 
magnesium hydroxide, calcium carbonate, and gypsum alka lines. 
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Upon the depletion of the reserves at Bay St. Elaine in 1959, the pl ant 
facili t ies were disassembl ed and moved to the adjacent Lake Pelto property 
which lay unde r eight feet of highly saline water. The Lake Pelto operation 
was a good producer of sul phur until 1974. 
Freeport also developed the Chacahoula dome in extreme west Lafourche 
Pari sh. A thin sulphur depos i t appears on this dome's southern extent. This 
location was used as an experimental station for Freeport ' s new vatting 
process . The molten sulphur was run over steel belts and flaked to lower 
dust loss en countered in l oadi ng and unloading. The dome had produced 
291,000 tons f rom February 1955 to December 1957. 
There were seven new domes exploited in the 1950' s. The small producer 
of the Jeffe rson Lake Sulphur Company at Starks; the sma ll producers of Nas h, 
Bay St. El ai ne , Chacahoul a , and a large producer at Garden Island Bay all 
owned by Freeport, and the l arge deposits at Moss Bluff and Spindletop o~med 
by Texas Gulf. These domes s ignificantly strengthened the reserves of the 
American Frasch sulphur industry. 
The Mexican sulphur i ndustry was also growing during the 1950's. 
Mexican sulphur shows had been found by oil drillers as far back as the early 
1900's mos t ly in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Seventy domes had been discovered 
by 1917, and about forty of t hese showed sulphur. Howe ver, the sulphur 
deposi t s were ignored by th e oil men. 
Frederi co Dechamps did the first constructive work i nvolving Mexican 
sulphur by cataloging the l ocation of known sulphur domes in 1936. He 
described the Petrerillos,Jalt ipan, Teterete, and San Cr istobal domes as 
having access ible routes of t ransportation to the Port of Coatzacoalcos, and 
prime target s for development . 
8 
(J) 
<( 
~ 
I-
w 
::c 
I-
LL-
0 
I.fl 
l&.I 
:t: 
0 
D 
b 
~ 
59a 
The next sulphur pioneer was Alfredo Breceda, who with the aid of 
engineer Manuel Urquidi investigated the wellsites where sulphur had been 
located. Together they completed a thorough surface survey of the area. 
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Breceda obtained the first sulphur rights in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec 
on June 15, 1942 which were granted by the Secretary of the Econo~y and the 
Fomento de Minero (Commission to Promote Minerals). 127 A four million acre 
area of land was delineated by the Mexican government to be the area of 
sulphur production, and was named the Sulphur Reserve. 
The concession granted to Breceda by the Fomento allowed him to search 
for sulphur in an outlined area, and to work any discovered deposit in this 
area. These concessions were only granted to Mexican citizens or Mexican 
companies. A large area wa s allowed to be explored under the concession, 
but only a much smaller and more specific area was allowed to be mined. This 
was establi.shed through a contract entered into by the operator and the 
Mexican government. The contract specified when the plant must be comp l eted, 
and the amount of royalti es to be paid to the government. 
Breceda began his offi cial minimal exploration in June 1952, whil e he 
simultaneously searched for financial backing.· He was turned down by the 
Mexican president and government, the major banks, and the rich personage of 
Mexico because of the intangibility of the sulphur. Breceda was then intro-
duced to the Brady brothers, drillers originally from Loui siana who had grown 
wealthy from wildcatting for oil in Texas and Venezuela. Breceda-Urquidi, 
and the Brady 1 s formed the Azufre S .A . 128 
The San Cristobal dome was the first dome to be explored. The property 
was surveyed, and then for a year and a half the Brady 's collected financing 
and equipment under the name of the Cia. Mexicana Minerales. 129 
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The first hole was drilled on April 1~ 1944, and the equipment failed 
in the process . The third hole showed su lphur, and at this time the San 
Cristobal dome concession was turned over to the Mexican Gulf Sulphur 
Company. 
The Brady's now moved to the Breceda-Urquidi concession near Jaltipan. 
The old oil field was located by seepage, and the remnants of old equipment. 
Sulphur wa s found in the first drilling. The brothers now moved across the 
Chachalapta River to Potrerillos. Sulphur was quickly found, and the 
option on the concession as purchased by the Pan .American Sulphur Company. 
The Brady's moved back to San Cristobal, but soon were exploring the Mezquital 
and Vi sta Hermosa domes that lay on the other side of the Coachapan River. 
Brady drilled off-set to the old Amezquite No. 2 whi ch had found sulphur at 
1042 feet, and again found sulphur in the first hole. 
The Vi sta Hermosa dome was di scovered by the Brady Brothers, and consulting 
geologist Walter H. Maddox . He di scovered the dome by scrutinizing five 
conspicuous surface points. Drilling at these points, and assistance from 
aerial photography proved the existence of the dome. It was the first dome in 
this region to be discovered by surface geology. Hi s geological reports were 
the basis of the creation of the Gulf Su lphur Corporation. Thi s brought the 
total to three Mexican sulphur companies sponsored by the Brady brothers . 
dri 11 ing. 
The American sulphur corporations had declined al l offers of exploration 
in Mexico during the 1940' s. The concepts of unknown taxation by the 
Mexican government, ability to drill in the jungle, ease of mining, production 
and transportation in the U.S. versus Mexico during World War II, and a 
healthy abundance of sulphur in the 1940's kept the American companies 
exploring Louisiana and Mi ssissippi at that time. It was not until 1949 that 
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the Texas Gulf corporation began exploring the Nopalapa concession near San 
Cristobal. 
San Cristobal had produced its first sulphur on March 15, 1954 for the 
Mexican Gulf Sulphur Company. Impatience and inexperience caused this 
operation to become unsuccessful. Financial pressures caused much of the 
problem and low production was its final end. 
The Mexican Gulf Sulphur Company was the first company setup by the 
Bradys~ Mexican Gulf had purchased two concessions from Bradys' Jlrnerican 
Sulphur Company. The Bradys had drilled ten wells with sulphur shows, and 
with the help of consultant geologist Walter Maddox, ten more wells were 
drilled on 125 acres. 
The tight structure at San Cristobal required the drilling of bleedwells 
to allow the drainage of excess cold water. The dome then came on stream 
on March 15, 1954. Production averaged 7454 tons per month for September 
and October. This was half the expected production. An increase in water 
capacity from one million to two million gallons a day was planned to 
increase production. The financial backing for this expansion came from 
Houston which became the monetary headquarters of the Mexican industry. 
The production still did not rise to profitable levels, and it was 
determined that the deposit was far more inconsistent than the original rich 
cores had shown. A greater amount of exploration shou ld have been undertaken 
to define the true potential s of the dome. Another realization was that 
the anticlinal structures relating to the salt domes in the Isthmus may or may 
not be suitable for the Frasch process. 
The Pan American Sulphur Company was incorporated April 17, 1944 with 
Texas backing. 130 Their propsect was the Jaltipan-Potrerillos dome area. 
Sixty-nine cores had been obtained by April 1952, and had relinquished 
evidence of a rich sulphur deposit. Reserves were estimated at 7,257,401 
tons in a twent ieth of the company controlled area. 
63 
The plant was begun in September 1953 and was finished within the year. 
September 24, 1954 was the first day of production with two mi 11 ion tons of 
sulphur produced by April 10, 1957. 
The Mezquital dome was located on the Coachapan River abbve San 
Cristobal. Sulphur was first produced here on May 3, 1956 by Cia. de Azufre 
Veracruz S.A., a subsidiary of Gulf-Sulphur Corporation. The Mezquital 
potential was estimated to be about eleven million tons proved and an 
additional 3.2 million probable tons. 
The Soledad dome, two mil es northeast oftheMezquital dome, was drilled 
by Gulf Sulphur who found a cap rock which contained 14% sulphur. The company 
set up one of the most sophi sticated and automated plants of the time to work 
the deposit. The total design was very compact in nature, and a precise 
record of temperatures and pressures was kept for each well by instrumentation. 
A great reservoir of hot water was maintained to rescue any well whi ch came 
under undue stress. A zeoli te water system di sposed of hot lime-soda tanks 
and insulation on the pipes. 
Mezquital production was greatly improved by a large ratio of bleed-
wells to production wells. Hot water input was concentrated by very closely 
spaced producing wells. Hot-water and air capacities were also raised, 
increasing production to a thousand tons a day, while continued exploratory 
dri 11 i ng proved a great amount of additional reserves in the surrounding 
cap rock. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Company began operating through i ts subsidiary Cia. 
Exploradora del Istmo, S.A. in August 1949. Unlike the other operations set 
up in Mexico, Texas Gulf already had money, experienced personnel, and 
equipment with which to begin its project. Their best property was 
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established to be the Nopalaca dome after aerial surveying, geophysical testing, 
geological investigation and core drilling of over 450 holes in 28 structures. 
The plant for Nopalaca was built on the Houston Ship Canal and shipped 
on barges to the Moss Bluff dome where it was tested for proficiency. It 
was then barged across the Gulf of Mexico in June 1956, and finally up 
river to th e plant site. This system solved the problems of building a 
whole new plant in the jungl e. The transportability of the plant all owed it 
to be moved to a new location, and to begin processing in a short time. 
The Mexican sulphur industry had advantages and disadvantages compared 
to the American industry. One disadvantage was the anticlinal structure of 
the domes which creates irregularities not seen in the regular mounds above 
the American domes. The two most serious problems caused by these irregularities 
were tight cap rocks and fissurous cap rocks. The former was solved by 
sophisticated drilling t echniques and bleed wells while the l atter was sol ved 
by an adequate mudding operations. 
Uniformity in depth of sulphur placement was another problem. The 
deposits varied in depth according to a north- south trend whi ch extended 
across the dome. The Mezquital dome produced sulphur in the southern 
zone at a depth of 180 feet. Here the mineralized zone was less than 100 
feet thick. The northern end contained sulphur in very smal l quantities and 
at a depth of 1110 feet. Between these extremes the depth of placement 
increased with a constant slope, and thickness increased to as much as 900 
feet at approximately the center of the traverse. Three-quarters of the 
distance across the traverse thicknesses had been reduced to approximately 
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250 feet until the northern extent was reached where only a few tens of 
feet of sulphur were seen, and eventually the end of deposits appeared. 131 
The main advantage of the Mexican sulphur domes were their great 
supplies of silt free freshwater which needed no settling. This supply was 
drawn from abundant rivers and lakes. The Mexican sulphur industry was 
bolstered by the great oil and gas fields contained in Mexico. These fields 
supplied the sulphur plants with plentiful and cheap f uel to drive their 
facilities. 
A turbul ent Mexican political scene has sometimes hampered the industry. 
Accusations of unfair labor practices, and wage scales were often targeted 
against the operations run by United States backing, and against politicians 
who were friendly to these interests. The result was bad for Mexico's 
image of stability above the border, and for its public and labor relations 
at home. 
Despite any and all obstacles the Mexican sulphur industry was established 
very quickly, and significantly. This was done by undercutting American 
sulphur prices to obtain a substantial portion of the market. In 1955, 
Mexican sulphur was offered at three dollars a ton less than American exports , 
and two dollars a ton less than American sulphur in the Uni ted States. This 
action disrupted the stable and narrow profit margin of the sulph ur industry. 
The Americans reduced prices to remain competitive, and from 1955 when 
the price of sulphur was $31.00 a ton for bright, and $30.00 a ton for dark, 
the price fell to $25.00 a ton for bright and $24.00 a ton for dark sulphur 
in 1957. Mex ican sulphur remained cheaper than .American. 
The effect of the lowered sul phur prices on the consumption industries 
was minimal. The sulphuric acid trade, which was accused of hi gh prices by 
its consumers , act ually wanted to raise their prices. However, this was 
made imposs ibl e by the l owered sulphur price. 
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There was no sudden: increase in the buying of sulph ur due to t he lowered 
Mexican pri ces , and never is in the sulphur market as a rule. Consumers of 
sulphur are in industri es where their demand stays constant with t heir l evel 
of production . However, the increase in sulphur prices will send t he 
consumers searching for al ternative suppliers such as pyrites or H2S recovered 
sulphur. 
The effect s of these alternative sulphur producers sets the ceil i ng fo r 
the Frasch sulphur, whil e the highest-cost high water to sulphur dome sets 
the basement . Competition intercedes between these two extremes. All 
consumers of sulphur demand an equal, and stable price be set because none wish 
to have their opposition obtain sulphur at a cheaper price. 
Th e Amer i can industry saw the entry of a short-lived competitor, Standard 
Sulphur, in November of 1953. Their operation at the Damon salt dome produced 
139,618 tons of sulphur before exhaustion in April of 1957. 
Texas Gul f al so began exploitation of the Fannett salt 1dome i n 1958. 
The dome produced 195,390 long tons that year. Texas Gul f was also prepari ng 
to mine the Bully Camp dome in Louisiana at that time. 
The American companies were also diversifying in t he 1950 1 s. The 
Duval Sulphur Company became the Duval Sulphur and Potash Company. Seventy 
percent of t heir sa les in 1957 were made in the potash market. They also 
expanded into copper and molybdenum. 
Jefferson Lake Sulphur Company began processing sour gas in British 
Columbia to recover elementa l sulphur, as well as the Manderson sour gas 
field in Wyomi ng. The Wyoming processing operation contributed about fifty-
five tons a day between 1955-1958. They also became acti ve in t he oi l and 
gas industry in Louisiana, Texas, and Oklahoma includi ng a natural gas 
processing plant which recovers gasoline, and liquified petrol eum gases 
from the natural gas. 
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Jefferson Lake also entered the petrochemical business. Their original 
products were cresylic acid and sodium sulphi de. 
Freeport expanded into the manganese industry by processing low grade 
ore in Cuba. They became the l argest manufacturer of manganese in the western 
hemisphere through this processi ng plant during World War II. They also 
helped the war effort by developing a nickel oxide plant at Ni caro, Cuba in 
1957. The ores were concentrated at Moa Bay in Cuba and then were separated 
at the refinery at Port Ni cke l below New Orleans. 
Freeport also began exploration and production in the oil and gas 
industry producing 2,245,000 barrels of oil in 1957. They also became 
involved in the potash industry through the National Potas h Company which was 
jointly founded by Freeport and the Consolidation Coal Comp any. They also 
were active in pyrites and operated a sulphur recovery plant in New Jersey. 
Texas Gulf's only expansions were in oil production at Boling, 
Spindletop, and Moss Bluff, and further explorationforoil in Texas and in 
Canada. Texas Gulf entered the recovered sulphur market by refining hydrogen 
sulphide and sulphur dioxide gases, and also began exploring for minerals, 
mainly copper-zinc sulphide and zinc-lead-pyrite ores. 
Offshore sulphur prospects were viewed as potentially very productive 
at the end of the 1950's. Statisti cs suggested that out of 125 underwater 
domes fifteen should be sulphur producing. Humble Oil and Refining Company 
located a dome about seven mil es offshore. Fourteen test well s proved the 
sulphur bearing cap rock to be between the depths of 300 to 600 feet. 
Reserves were estimated to be between thirty to forty million tons. 
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Freeport was chosen by Humble to work the dome because tbey were the 
first company to use seawater in the Frasch mining process, and because 
they had the greatest experience in underwater operations. The Grand Isl e 
plant posed challenges to construction because of its vulnerability to 100 
mile per hour winds, waves reaching over forty feet high, and extreme problems 
of corrosion in the open Gulf. Subsidence could draw the plant under the 
ocean's surface. 
Freeport constructed a huge Y-shaped structure at a cost of $30 million, 
with offshore technology accounting for $8 million of the total expense. 
The complex dwarfed any offshore oil platfonn as it was a mile long, stood 
seventy-five feet above sea level~ and was built to support drilling rigs 
and the rest of the mining facilities. The complex, which was begun in June 
1959 and completed in 1962, became one of the world's l argest and most 
efficient Frasch operations. 
The sour gas industry was intensely being developed in the 1950 1 s. The 
. greatest production was located in Canada with plants al so operating in the 
United States , Mexico, and France. The influx of sulphur into the market 
from these operations regan to effect the sulphur market. 
The removal of H2S from sour gas began in the 1940 ' s. Two programs 
started si.multaneously in Arkansas, one by Texas Gulf Sulphur in a plant 
near McKamie, Arkansas and the other by Southern Acid and Sulphur Company 
in cooperation with the Ohio State University Research Foundation at Magnoli a , 
Arkansas. 133 
The process first con centrates, and cleans the gas in monoethanolamine. 
It is: then dehydrated in a sol ution of amines and glycol s to an average of 
58% hydrogen sulphide, 41% carbon dioxide, and 19% mixed hydrocarbons. 134 
69 
The Claus met hod which ori ginated in ttE1880 1 s transformed hydrogen sulphide 
to elemental sulphur and water by introduction of a ferric oxide catalyst. 
The results were a 120 ton a day plant at McKamie in 1944, and an equal ly 
producing plant at Magnolia in 1946. Texas Gulf meanwhile built the Worland, 
Wyoming plant which produced 400 tons a day since 1949, and was for many 
years the largest plant in North America. Hydrogen sulphide recovery at the 
time, produced less sulphur by at least half than that of a good producing 
salt dome. Operation costs were less .. and the H2s gas was easily obtained 
which made H2S recovered sulphur a competitive factor in the sulphur market. 
The number of H2S plants totaled 45 by 1957 and production was up to 
484,000 tons. This was only the beginning for large sour gas fie lds existed 
along the Rockies from Canada to Mexico. West Texas and Wyoming were 
predicted to produce 400-500 tons a day for 25 years. 
The overriding control on H2S recovered sulphur was the demand for 
sweetened natural gas. The facilities to deliver sour gas are cost ly (the 
pipeline system). An abundance of sweet natural gas ki 11 s off the demand for 
treated sour gas, and resul tingly kills off its sulphur production. The 
sulphur recovery system must run 24 hours a day with a large supply of gas to 
be profitable. 
The Mexican sour gas industry in 1957 was affecting only the domestic 
acid producers. Mexico had only one sour gas field at Poza Rica, and in 
Tabasco. Exploration was being done in the eastern foot hill s of the Rockies 
in northern Mexico for additional sour gas. 
France in 1957 began processing H2S in the foothills of the Pyrenees 
near St. Marcet. The initi al production of the plant was the refinement of 
thrity-seven million cubic feet of gas a day, which produced a subsequent 
200 tons of sulphur. In 1959, 185 milHon cubic feet of gas was refined 
with the production of sulphur increased to 1000 tons a day. 
The result of this field, and the processing was France's sulphur 
independence. They instead became an exporter of su lph~r. This has 
adversely affected the Texas-Louisiana sulphur exporters as well as the 
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Spain, Portugal, and Cuba pyrite exporters of whom France was a good customer. 
It was determined that Canada held tremendous supplies of sour gas. A 
1958 find at Beland River contained reserves which app roached JO trillion 
cubic feet. A flow of 1.5 billion cubic feet a day with 16% H2s was proven. 
The total gas reserves of Canada were estimated to be between 200 to 300 
trillion cubic feet. The gas in the east rlainswere sweet and dry while those 
in the foothills were sour and wet. :This sour gas was estimated as being as 
high as 30% H2s with the average at about 15%. 
Canada's production in 1958 came from six recovery plants each producing 
290,000 tons of sulphur a year. The sul phu r from these plants was restricted 
to nearby local markets. The demand here was small . The reason for the 
restriction was that the sour gas plants were landlocked. It wa~ 600 miles 
to the Pacific Ocean and 1200 miles to the Great Lakes. The Vancouver Pacific 
Outlet was reached by inland rail. The price here was $9.85 a l ong ton which 
undercut the Worland, Wyoming prices of $14.78 a long ton posted to the pulp 
and paper manufactureres in the northwest. However, t he Far East trade, 
which would have been a favorabl e target for the Canadian sulphur, was still 
contro 11 ed by the United States and Coatzacoa lcos ports. 
A possible solution to deliver the sul phur to external markets was to 
liquefy the H2s, and then extract the sulphur by the Claus process at these 
market centers . The piping would easily defeat rail costs. The major problems 
foreseen were corrosion to the pipe, and t he deadly toxicity of the gas if it 
were to leak out. 
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Frasch sulphur operations and H2S recovery plants were judged to be 
comparable in cost in the l ate fifty's. Frasch operations held t he advantages 
of lower actual operation costs, and longer operating life. The drilling 
costs pertaining to development and production were lower wi thin H2s operations. 
These variabl es then tended to cancel each other out. 
Both Texas Gulf and Jefferson Lake were in Canada by 1959, with Freeport 
and Pan America also examining Canada's sulphur potentia l s. At t hi s time the 
question of who would actually sweeten the gas, the oil company or the su lphur 
company, was undecided. Texas Gul f was not concerned about this detail as 
much as they were of holding on to their share of the H2S market, in order to 
protect their interests in the overall sulphur market. They were acti ve in 
investigating the French water-pressure scrubbing method to advance their 
operations as far as possibl e. Jefferson Lake held a 69% interest in their 
Jefferson Lake Petrochemical s of Canada Ltd. subsidiary whi ch built a British 
Columbia plant in 1957 wi th its first shipment going to the northwest 
territorial paper mills. This plant received the earliest H2s gas extracted 
by the West.coas t Transmission Company. Their supply came from 70% of the reserves 
in the Peace River Area. Jefferson Lake was projected to process all of the 
Peace River Area, and 80,000 acres in the Calgary Area. They al so planned 
to process the Westcoast Transmission Savanna Creak Area . targeted for piping 
to Idaho. The plants were to be built in East Calgary, Savanna Creek, and 
Coleman. 
Additional factors seen to be coming into play at the end of the 1950's 
began with the potential reserves of fonnerly nonconsequential producing 
nations.. The Middle East held great potential for recovered sulphur from 
their many sour gas fields, and from sulphur contaminated oil. Russia had 
the potential to produce 175,200,000 tons of elemental sulphur, native 
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sulphur recovered from the Orkla Pyrite Process, and sulphur recovered from 
Banku oil. Japan and China were seen as potential volcanic sulphur exporters 
also. 
Hundreds of by-product recovery operations were predicted to arise in 
North America and Europe~ and were predicted to capture parts of the sulphuric 
acid industry's sulphur demand. The recoverers held 19% of the sulphuric acid 
industry's sulphur demand at the end of the 1950's while elemental sulphur 
held 70% and pyrites held 11%. 
The Mexican industry saw the entrance of a new competitor in 1959 as 
Texas International Sulphur Company began operating a Frasch plant on its 
Texistepec Concession. It was a short lived venture, and closed in 1962 after 
production of only 50,000 tons of sulphur. 
American interests in Mexico became stressed in 1961 due to national 
law which required all mining operations in the country to be owned by a two 
thirds majority of Mexican nationals. Further pressure was brought to bear 
on the American companies to Mexicanize in 1965 when the Mexican government 
instituted export controls on the Frasch industry. 135 This action was taken 
in order to equalize the size of exports with the expansion of reserves. It 
also served to motivate the development of a domestic chemical fertilizer 
industry. 
The results of the instituted controls were beneficial as exports 
increased in 1967 due to the sizable expansion of reserves. A strong 
fertilizer industry did develop in Mexico, and by late 1966 the largest 
sulphur producer, Pan American Sulphur Company, was controlled by a two 
thirds Mexican interest. 
The Mexican government gained their wanted control over the industry 
while the American sulphur companies gained a steady buyer in the developing 
Mexican fertilizer industry, and also made a good profit on the export of 
sulphur based on the sizabl e increases of their reserves. The Americans 
also enjoyed the benefit of lower taxes while the Mexicans were able to 
invest in a profitable domestic industry. 
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In America, the development of the liquid transport of sulphur greatly 
modifi ed the competitive stance of the American producers in the 1960 1 s. 
Texas Gulf completed its first liquid sulphur terminal at Cincinnati in 
1959 which served the Ohio Valley. 136 A huge facility was completed in 
Beaumont, Texas on the Neches River in 1960. This terminal handled both 
liquid and solid sulphur from its four Texas Frasch mines. The tenninal 
serviced rail, truck, barge, and ocean going vessels, and effectively reduced 
Texas Gulf's handling costs by 30-40 percent. Texas Gulf continued its 
lqiuid terminal expansion, and by 1963 had ten more terminals compl eted. A 
converted 15,000 ton tanker, the S.S. Marine Sulphur Queen, was chartered 
to ship liquid sulphur to Tampa and the Atlantic Seaboard. It began 
operation in 1961. 
Freeport began in mid-1959 to construct a liquid sulphur transport 
system. Contracts were made with independent marine transportation companies 
to build and operate new terminals, and marine equipment costing $20 million. 
Freeport provided additional facilities at a cost of between $3 to 4 million. 
They also leased the S.S . . Louisiana Sulphur and S.S. Louisiana Brimstone to 
service its domestic seaboard markets. 
The Pan American Sulphur Company constructed its Tampa terminal in 1961 
to partially handle its United States imports. This fac ility was later 
expanded, and a second terminal was built at Newark, New Jersey. Gulf 
Sulphur Corporation began operation of liquid sulphur tenninals in 1962 at 
Tampa and Baltimore. 
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The tota l number of storage and tnansshipment terminals in 1963 
amounted t o twenty-seven for the combined U.S. and Mexican Frasch producers. 137 
The two smal l er Ameri can companies, Jefferson Lake and Duval shipped liquid 
sulphur by tank t ruck or railroad car, and did not build any liquid su l phur 
t enninal s i n t he 1960's. Their shipping was still primarily in solid form. 
In 1964 , Sul exco chartered two 25,000-ton converted tankers, the Naess 
Texas and t he Naess Loui siana, and began transporting liquid sulphur overseas . 
An $18 milli on liquid t enninal was built at Rotterdam, Netherlands with a 
500,000 t on a year handl ing capacity. This terminal was expanded i n 1965, 
and a second t enninal was built at Dublin, Ireland. 
The Pa n Ameri can Sulphur Company began liquid shipments to their 
Immingham, Engl and facil ity in 1965. The 60,000-ton liquid tenninal was 
expected to handl e 225,000 tons of sulphur a year, and was serviced by t hree 
chartered tanke rs . 
Liquid sulphur shiments quickly became the mode of domestic transport 
increas ing from1 5 percent in 1959 to an estimated 90 percent in 1963. Liquid 
sulphur s hi ppi ng brought advantages to the sulphur producer. They forced 
the formul ati on of long-term contracts with the buyer guaranteeing a steady 
flow of sal es for t he producer. The additional expense of heated storage 
forced lower i nventories to be maintained by both producer and consumer 
which al so sp urred t he writing of longer-term contracts. Sulphur producer s 
happily fin anced consumer conversions to liquid facilities to secure these 
longer t erm contracts . The Americans also pushed for the rapid conversion 
to liquid faci liti es in order to defeat a Mexican shippi ng advantage. The 
Mexi cans were abl e t o sh ip their solid sulphur to the United States on any 
foreign freighter they were able to secure. The American producers were 
only allowed t o shi p their solid sulphur aboard American freighters to 
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domestic ports. The requirement of special vessels to carry liquid sulphur 
reduced the Mexican advantage. 
The change to liquid sulphur delivery was advantageous to the consumers 
who rapidly complied to the building of liquid handling facilities. Most 
sulphur consuming processes use sulphur in liquid form including the 
manufacture of sulphuric acid. The delivery of liquid sulphur elimi nated the 
consumer's energy costs in melting the sulphur down into usable form. The 
shipment of liquid sulphur defeated the handling losses encountered in 
shipping dry sulphur which usually averaged about 0.5 percent. 138 Liquid 
sulphur also could not be contaminated .by rroisture; sca le or other foreign 
matter, and no dust was produced to corrode adjacent eq uipment or create an 
explosion hazard. After the initial cost of conversion was overcome, a plant 
operated at costs of $2.00 less a ton. Less machinery and l abor is needed 
for the handling of liquid sulphur. 
The establishment of the liqu id handling of sulphur came at a time of 
surplus in the sulphur market. The beginning of this surplus period was in 
1958. A major price reduction in 1957 by American producers had been aimed 
at regaining their share of the market which the Mexican producers had taken 
over. The Mexican producers retained their portion of the market by reducing 
prices or lowering freight costs. However, the amount of Mexican su lphur 
imported into the U~S. did level off. The effect on the American producers 
was their loss of $35 million in revenue from 1957 to 1959. 
The Frasch producers began quoting prices on delivery in 1958 whi ch broke 
with the pattern of f.o.b. quoting which had been in practice since Herman 
Frasch began selling Frasch sulphur in 1897. Freight allowances and 
discounts became the competitive variable in securing contracts in the harder 
fought for markets. The result was the reduction in the importance of the 
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posted price of Frasch sulphur. 
The Canadian and French recovered sulphur continued to take more of the 
market away from the Frasch producers. These increased supplies and the 
delivery pricing of sulphur caused sulphur to become a regionally priced 
commodity where transportation costs controlled the success of the producer 
in a certain regional market. 
The Canadians began enjoying a reduced freight rate in rail shipment 
in 1961 from Alberta to Chicago from $19.94 per ton to $12.88 per ton. 139 
This allowed Canadian recovered sulphur to be sold for $26.00 a ton in the 
Midwest which forced the Frasch producers to lower their Midwest prices to 
remain competitive. Texas Gulf and Freeport took the Canadian rail rates 
in front of the Interstate Conrnerce Conrnission arguing that the Alberta-
Chicago rate equalled the shorter distance rate from the Gulf of Mexico to 
Chicago. Unfortunately American interests were defeated on appeal in 
January of 1966. 
The .American producers, in an attempt to combat the further domestic 
invasion by foreign sulphur suppli es, took a stance of non-competition in 
the pricing of their sulphur. Through their installation of liquid hand ling 
facilities they put an emphasis on customer service and a subsequent closer 
relationship between con sumer and producer. 
The four major Ameri can sulphur companies reinstituted the Sulphur 
Export Corporation in 1958 to answer the continuing advances of the Mexican, 
Canadian, and French sulphur producers. Sulexco once again provided an 
united front to negotiate with the foreign producers. It al so provided 
technical aid and ocean freight assistance to the American producers as 
these services became increasingly important with the growth of liquid 
sulphur transport. 
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Sulexco had its disadvantages. Not all foreign consLDTiers wished to buy 
from a marketing cartel. The t wo larger companies, Texas Gulf and Freeport 
held the controlling interests i n the cartel. They were will ing to reduce 
prices in order to keep sales . tonnage up. The smaller companies, Jefferson 
Lake and Duval, were operating at higher costs with marg inal deposits, and 
could not readily afford these price reductions. Unfortunately, with only 
a minor say in Sulexco's poli cy they were forced to ha ve t his portion of 
their output (60%) manipul ated by the larger companies. 
Sulexco proved to be l ess t han effective in combatt ing the foreign 
interests as the American' s share of the world market decl ined by 35% 
between 1960 and 1963. The major foreign inroad was made by the Lacq, France 
state controlled producer SNPA which was able to increase its portion of t he 
Western European Market from 25 to 36 percent. This he lped the U.S. 
producers hit a twenty-year l ow i n both domestic and foreign shipments. 
In mid-1963, the world sul phur market changed drast i cal ly. 140 Dema nd 
quickly increased on a large scal e, while the small expansion of reserves 
during the depressed years f rom 1958 to mid-1963 left t he Frasch producers 
short of supply. This shortage l asted from 1964 -1967. During those yea rs , 
the tot al increase in consumption in the United States was 32 percent, and 
in the western bloc countri es 38 percent. Meanwhile, production increased 
29 percent, but could not keep pace with demand. Subsequently, sulphur 
stockpiles st eadily shrank f rom 1 million tons in 1964 t o . 3 million tons 
in 1967. 
Texas Gulf raised its posted price of sulphur by $2 .00 a ton in res ponse 
to the increased demand in 1964 . The other U.S. producers and Mexican 
producers followed suit, but the Americans continued to give discounts in 
markets where Mexican and Canadian sulphur was present . The sharp i ncrease 
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in demand coupled with a wide differential between foreign and American 
sulphur induced the Ameri can companies to export 2.67 million tons in 1965, 
an all time industry high . 
The attractive export markets consequently caused the domestic market 
to suffer. The government rectified the situation by limiting Frasch exports . 
Sulexco and the government worked out a rationing system in 1966 for the 
industry's export trade on an individual country basis. The only adverse 
effect of the rationing was an acute shortage in countries who had depended 
on an additional Pan Ameri can supply which had been cut due to a pl ant 
failure. 
The Mexican industry raised their price on sulphur delivered to the U. S. 
by $5.00 a ton in 1966. The Americans adjusted their domestic price by 
eliminating allowances and manipulating transportation and handling charges. 
The continued increase in demand finally forced the American companies to 
raise their domestic prices in December 1966. Freeport raised its price on 
dark sulphur f .o.b. at Port sulphur by $2.50 oer ton. Texas Gulf also 
increased its domest icated price by $2.50 per ton to $28.00 per ton for bright 
sulphur f .o.b. mines. 
Pan American then announced a $10. 00 per ton increase for its sulphur 
sold in the United States which was to go into effect on January 1, 1967. 
Gulf Sulphur also increased prices on contracts which came up for renewal. 
In general, foreign prices were well above the domestic market prices. In 
1966, export price for U. S. Frasch sulp hur (bright) for f.o.b. U.S. Gulf 
ports was $39.00 per ton. Mexican Frasch sulphur and recovered sulphur were 
even higher than the Ameri can prices. 141 
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Two more price increases were experienced in 1967 as the shortage 
continued. Gulf port pri ces increased by $4.00 per ton f.o.b. in April, and 
then aonther $5.50 per ton in October. Freeport remained the price l eader 
throughout the year demonstrating its dominance in the Jlmerican industry 
at this time. The increased price still did not slow consumer demand so an 
allocation systems was created by the major producers. Texas Gulf limi ted 
deliveries to 75 percent of their 1965 level in September of 1966. In 1968, 
Texas Gulf limited its del iveries to 65 percent of its 1965 level. Freeport 
also began limiting deliveries to 90 percent of their base tonnage in 1967. 
Export pd ces increased again in 1967 as Pan American raised its 
common~type sulphur to $50. 00 per ton for its regular customers, and to 
$55.00 per ton for spot sa l es f .o.b. Coatzacoalcos, Mexico. Bright sulphur 
prices were raised to $52.00 and $57.00 per ton on the same basis. Canadian 
recovered sulphur was selling for $56.50 per ton f.o.b. in Vancouver. 
In 1968, the shortage came to an end as non-communist country production 
exceeded shipments. Increased outputs of Canadian recovered sulphur and both 
American and Mexican Frasch su l phur were important in reversing the shortage 
as was the l eveling off of U. S. consumption. In late 1968, \'1estern 
European prices were reduced by $2.00 per ton. In January 1969, Canadian 
and domestic markets saw the same kind of price reductions. 
The shortage had sparked renewed interest in off-shore sulphur 
exploration. The Freeport operation at Grand Isle had been the on ly off-
shore mine in the industry. However, the original Grand Isle concession was 
not the on lv lease provided to Freeport by Humble Qi 1. There was al so a proven 
concession on the Grand Isle, Block 16 property, and a prospective concession 
located on the Wes t Delta, Blo ck 30 property. 
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In 1968, the Grand Isle, Block 16 property was brought into production 
by Freeport. The $25 million plant was named Caminada, and was located in 
fifty feet of water six mil es off the Louisiana coast. The actual sulphur 
deposit was mined at a depth of 1750 feet below sea level. These were the 
only two offshore complexes put into operation with the West Delta, Block 30 
land not being exploited. 
However, a great deal of offshore property had been obtained for further 
exploration. In the shortage year of 1965, the United States Bureau of Land 
Management awarded leases for the exploration of sulphur on 72,000 acres of 
outer continental shelf located some forty to eighty miles from the Galveston-
Freeport area. 142 The submerged shelf was found at depths of 110 to 180 feet. 
The leases were obtained by competitive bidding between seven major companies 
and combines. This bidding produced an average cost per acre of .$468, highest 
cost of any outer shelf property, except those p~rtaining to certain oi~ and gas 
drainage rights. The leases were to last for ten years, with the federal 
. government receiving either 10 percent of the gross product or value of 
sulphur at the wellhead, but never receiving less than $2.00 per long ton of 
sulphur. 
This high cost of initial investment was the factor which deterred the 
extensive mining of far offshore sulphur. Drilling costs, facilities• 
building and operation costs, and transportation costs all increase well above 
those of near or onshore plants, and have subsequently retarded the development 
of far offshore Frasch operations. 
The reopening of abandoned Frasch mines was another development brought 
about by the shortage of sulphur, and was partially responsible for its 
eventual end. These reopenings were 1 argely brought about by new corporate 
entrys into the sulphur market. 
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Union Texas Petroleum Division, a subsidiary of Allied Chemical 
Corporation, led the entri es by reopening the original Union Sulphur Mine at 
Sulphur Mine, Louisiana. Production began on September 18, 1966. Phelan 
Sulphur Company, a subsidiary of the John H. Phelan Oi l Company, reopened the 
Nash Dome which had produced sulphur for Freeport between 1954 and 1956. The 
$2. 5 mi 11 ion pl ant was built by Phelan in 1966, and produced 150 ,000 long 
tons with first shipments going out in 1967. Phelan then put the plant on 
a care and maintenance basis in 1969, as demand once again slackened and 
because the remaining reserves were believed to be substantial. The Hooker 
Chemical Company reopened the original Freeport Bryan Mound mine in June of 
1967. Finally, U.S. Oil of Louisiana reopened the Freeport mine at 
Chacahoula in 1967 after it had been closed for five years. The dome produced 
150,000 tons a year until the beginning of 1970 when operations were cutback 
to 60 percent. The dome which produced 1.2 million tons of sulphur for 
Freeport from 1955 to 1962, was believed to contain a four million ton 
sulphur reserve. 
Poland also began contributing Frasch sulphur to the world market on a 
significant sca le in 1967 and 1968 from plants at Jeziorak and Grzybow. The 
combined production of the two plants was 1,300,000 tons of sulphur per year. 
A period of oversupply began in 1969 as consumption once again declined. 
A renewed competition for sal es began, and stockpiles increased. Demand 
rose to 27.8 million tons in 1969, up 4.1 percent while supply grew by 5.3 
percent to 28.9 million tons. This was the second year of surpluses . 143 
Price leadership by Frasch producers was almost eliminated in 1969. 
U.S. domestic prices still were officially posted at $39 to $40 per ton, but 
actual prices were running as low as $20 to $25 ~r ton on the market. 
82 
Production aga in was curtailed with marginal operations such as Freeport's 
second far offs hore venture at Caminada being closed. Freeport also lowered 
production at four other pl ants. Texas Gulf responded by 1 oweri ng production 
to under three million tons annually, and did not reopen its Texistepec 
plant in Mexi co. 
Duval, who had become the third largest U.S. producer by virtue of its 
new 1.5 million ton per year eulberson County plant in west Texas, was faced 
with the burden of two milli on additional tons of surp lus unless they closed 
down some of their facili ties. Their response was the cl osing of their Fort 
Stockton mine in Pecos County, Texas, and their operation at the Orchard 
Dome in May of 1970. 
The Orchard mine had been producing 100,000 tons of sulphur per year up 
through 1969. However, the reserve was known to be almost depleted wi t h only 
marginal fl ank depos its . being mined. The dome was also a high water ratio 
dome compared to other Frasch producers, and consequent ly reopening was not 
planned. 
The Fort Stockton mine was producing 1000 tons per day in mid-1968, with 
the total output for 1968 being 271,000 long tons. The mine was estimated 
to be a 350,000 ton per year producer, and was planned to be reopened when 
the market sit uation became favorable. 
The Rustler Springs Mine in Culberson County was the largest mine known 
to exist in the non-communi st world. The plant contained a forty mil l ion 
. gallon reservoir with water delivered by pipeline from a source forty miles 
away. The plant was determined to have between forty-six and fifty-seven 
million tons of reserves, and the capability of producing 1.5 million tons of 
sulphur per year. The sulphur was shipped by rail to Gal veston, Texas, some 
900 miles eastward. The sulphur could then be shipped to terminals at 
Savannah, Tampa, or Wilmi ngton. Duval remained competitive i n the early 
seventi es , despite t he h.i gh overheads encountered in operating this pl ant. 
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The surpl us of sulphur was added to significantly in March of 1970 when 
huge stocks of Canadian recovered sulphur reached the market. The Canadian 
stocks had risen to 2.2 million tons with the at mine price being $10.00 or 
l ess , and t he f .o.b. export price at Vancouver being $18.00 a ton. Sulexco 
was now offe r i ng its export sulphur at Rotterdam for $27 .00 per ton, but 
with the inf lux of Canadi an sulphur exports began to decline toward the 
volume of import s ent ering the United States. Mexico also was adverse ly 
affected by t hi s new influx of cheap sour gas sulphur, and responded by 
closing several of its operations. 
The rest of 1970 saw the continued deterioration of the market price 
with the Frasch producer s nearly being eliminated from t he foreign market. 
The domes ti c ma rket was al so suffering due to the flood of by-product su l phur 
from Canada. The res ult was the operation of the Frasch plants at nearl y a 
zero profit margin. 
Freeport as ked for an import duty to be levied agai nst the Canadian by-
product sulphur saying that the Canadians were selling t heir sulphur under 
cost, and covering their actions by manipulating their balance sheets. 144 
No act i on was taken against the Canadian sulphur which was now selling for 
as low as $5.00 per ton f ~ o.b. to new customers. 
The demand for natural gas also rose at this time primarily due to a 
greater demand by t he Uni ted States. Canada processed more sour gas, and 
opened six more recovery plants all producing about 350,000 tons per year . 
Six other pl ants were enl arged to an additional 20% of initial production 
for an increase of 600,000 tons. 
Canada had become the worl d's leading exporter of sulphur with its 
output growing to seven million tons a year. The U.S., who had produced 
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7.15 million tons in 1969, only produced six million tons in 1970. Meanwhile, 
U.S. imports were seen to be up from 1.7 million tons in 1969 to two million 
tons in 1970. The Frasch producers looked toward the federal government 
for protection from imports to retain their domestic market. 
Meanwhile, Alberta was devising better ways to sh ip their combi ned 
sulphur stocks from separated poin ts of production to Vancouver in order to 
streamline their industry. A central stockpile was planned to service al l 
companies operating in Canada. Twenty-four members' stocks were to be kept 
track of by a computerized accounting system. 
The low price of sulphur also took its toll on the one time sole 
possessor of the market. In November 1970, the Sicilian sulphur industry 
went out of business with the complete ,shut down of all its: mines. 
The oversupply of sulphur worsened in 1971 as competition increased 
mostly due to Canada and Pol and:45 Canada had produced 4.4 million tons of 
sulphur in 1970, and had produced 5.8 million more tons by August 1971. The 
distribution of this output saw 3. 5 million tons reaching the market with 
1.1 million tons of this as free aid sulphur to Canadian industries as 
dictated by the government. The remaining 2.3 million tons were added to 
a six million ton existing stockpile. Projections were made at t his time 
which foresaw a nine million ton production in 1975, and a twelve million ton 
production by 1980. Stockpiles would amount to twenty million tons in 1975, 
and sixty million tons in 1980. Canada would easily control the market with 
such stockpiles. 
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The gross excess of stockpiles arose due to the in vol un tarynature of the supply 
of by-product sulphur rising far ahead o"f demand. The greater amount of natural 
gas demanded caused the increase innatural gas produced, and i ts final 
increased sweetening. The huge stockpiles were the end result of this chain 
of events. 
The price was effectively kept low by the abundance of the Canadian by-
product sulphur. The posted price f .o.b. in Alberta was $6.00 per ton, and 
at Vancouver $17.00 per ton. Canadi an su lphur wa s selling for $22.00 per 
ton in Europe while Frasch was $26.00 per ton at its export terminals. 
Alberta then decided to support the sulphur market by stockpiling greater 
quantities, and selling only small er amounts when the market was fa vorable 
for $15.00 f.o.b. Alberta. 
The United States and Mexico continued to take meas ures to remain 
competitive in the market. Texas Gulf shutdown its Gulf Dome wh ich produced 
90,000 tons per year. Mexican production declined by .3 million tons. Gulf 
Sulphur lowered production at its Jaltipan mine, and closed their facilities 
at Salinas. 
The international sulphur producers met in August 1971 to reach an 
agreement on the restraint of output, and to fix a floo r price to offer 
consumers. Higher pr-ices were foreseen in the near fut ure, and were 
expected to rise at a rate of five percent per annum with growth in demand. 
The sulphur surplus was also expected to continue. The compani es resolved to 
limit sulphur rates through a cartel-like pact formed between Poland , Mexico, 
France, and Alberta. The United States was unable to join due to American 
anti-trust laws. The countries agreed to unil aterally limit sal es in 
response to market forces, and Nixon's price freeze. Maximum annual sa les 
were determined to be 1) Canada 3.8 million tons, 2) France 1.9 mill ion tons, 
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3) Poland 3.3 .million tons, 4) Mexico 3.3 million tons , and 5) the U.S. 
6.4"".'7.6 million tons. These figures represented only sixty percent of world 
consumption which allowed 1 eeway for the producers to meet demand .146 
The market saw the lowest prices in twenty years in 1971, with the 
Frasch producers operating at distress levels. The Po lish and Canadians 
enjoyed an increase in production l evels and profits. Environmenta l sulphur 
recovered from so2 andotherpollutants associated wi t h industry also began 
appearing on the market. The total of al l fonTis marketed in 1971 was 9.48 
million tons. The U.S. did become a net exporter of sulphur in 1971 after a 
three year period of being a net importer. 
In March 1972, Texas Gulf and Freeport raised prices against the trend. 
Texas Gulf's increase was $3.50 per ton while Freeport 's increase was only 
$3.00 per ton. The increase was to counter Mexican dumping of sulphur on 
the lower states between Florida and Arizona. Thi s area was also i solated 
from the Canadian supply. The next month Freeport withdrew the increase due 
to market conditions with Texas Gulf following suit. Both companies believed 
the long term effects would be detrimenta l to their interests, and therefore 
they dropped the increase. 
Freeport continued to diversify from sulphur in early 1971 by operat ing 
through the Freeport Minerals Company. They began processing nickel and 
I 
cobalt at their Greenvale complex in Queensland, Austra lia. They also began 
exploiting copper in Iran and Indonesia as well as continued expansion in 
kaolin, chemicals, potash, and Mexican asbestos. 
Freeport and the other Frasch producers were al so planning st rategy for 
the near future. They realized that recovered sulphur would soon hold sixty 
percent of the rrarket. The compani es planned to operate their barely 
profitable large domes, and discontinue operation of all marginal domes. 
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The continued oversupply had kept the sulphur prices down in 1972 although 
consumption had increased. The United States shipment distribution domestically 
was: Frasch 55%, recovered 17%, all other forms 10%. Frasch exports increased 
23%, but were still at the low level of eighteen percent. Imports were 
down 15% while stocks were reduced by nine percent. 
Mexican sulphur sales were also down in the first half of 1972 by some 
20%. The industry produced 482,786 metric tons of sulphur of which 440,300 
tons were Frasch produced while 29,142 tons were produced by recovered sour 
. gas, and 13,344 tons came from volcanic origin. Mexican exports declined 
over the same period. 147 
In February 1973, Texas Gulf was followed by Freeport in raising ton 
prices by $3.00. The effects were mostly felt by the Gulf coast, the South 
Atlantic seaboard, and up the Mississippi River to St. Louis which in effect 
was 90% of Freeport's customers. The ·companies were able to do this because 
demand was up, and the U. S. Tariff Commission had stopped the dumping of 
Mexican sulphur on the U. S. market. Anti-Canadian dumping tariffs were also 
planned for enactment. The increase brought the price f.o.b. at Tampa to 
· $28.00 which was actually $17.00 less than the 1969 price. 148 
The world market began to see some new developments in 1973. Mexico 
began trading with China and supplied it with 50,000 tons of sulphur on a 
six month contract. The natural gas supply began to tighten, and U. S. 
imports of Canadian and Mexican sulphur dropped by fifteen percent. Thi s 
hinted to a change developing in the sulphur supply and demand pattern. 
Canada raised its pri ce to $9.00 per ton f.o.b. Alberta and British 
Columbia a $2.00 increase. The Canadians wished to invade t he Florida 
market, but were plagued by shipping problems. The Canadians stored thei r 
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sulphur in the fo rm of sl ate because of the enormous size of their stocks 
which disallowed liquid storage, and because slating did keep dust down and 
pennit easy flow when hand ling the sulphur. However, the slated sulphur must 
be reliquified in Florida. This fact along with the distance of s hipping to 
Florida were holding back this segment of the Canadian industry's growth. 
The hearings conducted by the U.S. Treasury department found Canada 
guilty of dumping sulphur on the U.S. market. The dumpi ng occurred from May 
1971 to February 1972. Texas Gulf and Canadian Occidenta l were abso lved of 
guilt. 
U.S. Fras ch sulphur increased twice in 1973. The increase was three 
dollars a ton each time . Problems in slating Canadian sulphur increased 
their f.o.b. Vanco uver pri ce to $21.00 per ton. Their North European prices 
were rai sed to a range of $27.00 to $29.00 c.i.f. per ton. Mexico, France, 
and Poland posted the same prices as Canada for their liquid sulphur c.i.f. 
North Europe. U.S. Frasch so lfd bright f.o.b. Gulf wa~ $23.00 per ton, and 
U.S. Frasch liquid bright c.i.f. North Europe was $30.00 per ton as of 
October 1973. 
The increased Frasch prices of 1973 were caused by a s ubstantia l increase 
in the demand of U. S. fertil izer industry. Eleven million long tons were 
marketed, an increase of 8% over 1972. Frasch contributed 69% of the sulphur, 
recovered sources 21%, and a ll other forms 10%. Frasch sulphur held 53% of 
the domestic market where consumption had risen by 6% to 56% of the sulphur 
produced. The average pri ce per ton of Frasch sulphur sold for $18.26 per 
1 ong ton. 
Freeport reported earnings of $32.9 mi.llion for 1973 which almost doubl ed 
their 1972 earni ngs of $17. 1 million. Freeport's output was down 79,000 tons 
from 1972 at 3.3 million tons, but they also bought and sold 200,000 additional 
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tons of recovered sulphur. Their Frasch production came from the Grand 
Ecaille, Lake Pelto, Grand Isle; and Garden Island Bay operations. Both 
Grand Ecaille and Lake Pelto were described as nearly economicall_y depleted in 
April of 1974. 
Canada instituted a one-third increase upon its f.o.b. mine price 
increasing it from $15.00 to $20.00 per ton in April of 1974. The Canadian 
export price increased into a range from $25.00-$45.00 per ton f .o .b. 
Vancouver. Canadian stockpiles continued to grow with projected year end 
stocks to equal 15 million tons. Canada required an expansion in their 
slating capacity and improved rail transportation to reduce these stocks as 
well as increased slate storage capacity to handle the projected increased 
stocks. 
The American major producers, Texasgulf Inc. and Freeport, correspondingly 
raised their domestic sulphur prices by $5.50 per ton following the increase 
by Canada. Freeport also announced an increase in their handling, storage, 
transportation, and insurance charges as reflectedinthe ir costs. The 
increase brought Freeport' s regular dark sulphur price f.o.b. Port Sulphur, 
Louisiana to $33.50 per ton. The price of f.o.b. ~ampatenninal sulphur 
became $36.50 per ton serving the Florida market which had become the world's 
largest sulphur market. Prices to other markets were based on transportation 
costs to those markets. Texasgulf's prices were similar to Freeport's, and 
both comoani es ' price schedules were subject to U.S. government price controls 
and contract provisions. The American increase was only an 18% increase 
compared to the Canadians' 33% increase. 
Freeport furth er expanded its diversified interests in 1974 by installing 
a 160 ton a day sulphuric acid plant at Port Sulphur fed by stack gases of 
the port's sulphur cleaning operation. Freeport also was operating a 1.4 
million ton per yea r phosphoric acid plant at Uncle Sam, Louisiana. The 
plant used 615 ,000 tons of sulphur per year in 1974, and was suppl ied by 
Freeport 1 s Po·rt Sulphur faci l ities. 
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Overall Frasch sulphur controlled - 69% of the domestic market in 1974 
by marketing 11.5 million tons of brimstone.'149 Domestic consumption had 
increased by 10% over 1973 levels with the increase attributed on t he most 
part to the continued increase of demand in the fertil i zer i ndustry. 
Total production of sul phur in the U.S. exceeded demand for t he eighth 
straight year in 1975.150 The industrial demand weakened with an especia lly 
disconsorting slow down in t he demand of the fertilizer i ndustry. Freeport 
consequently closed its Lake Pelto offshore venture. Fr asch su l phur 
provided for sixty-five percent of the 11.25 million tons of sulphur produced 
in the Uni ted Stat es in 1975. 
Imports of sulphur decreased by sixteen percent, from 2.'15 to l.8 mill ion 
tons. Stockpil es rose by t hirty percent from 3.96 mi ll ion tons i n 1974 t o 
5.'15 million tons in 1975. The average value of all elemental sulph ur was 
$46.50 per t on versus $28.88 per ton in 1974. This was an increase of sixt y-
one percent. 
In 1976, production was sti l l ahead of domestic demand for the ninth 
straight yea r. 151 Indust r ia l demand again was down, with the retarded growt h 
in the fertil izer industry again present. Both imports and exports declined, 
and the U. S. again became a net importer of sulphur. The average shipment 
value of sulphur showed a s l ight increase in price in 1976 compared to 1975. 
Total production was down four percent from 11.25 mill ion tons in 1975 t o 
10.8 million tons in 1976 with Texasgulf ending production at its Spindletop 
operation. Frasch sources suppl ied only 59% of the domestic market, a decline 
of 6% from 1975. The recovered sulphur industry increased by 3% to hold a 29% 
porti on of t he market. Imports decreased by 18%. The average Frasch, and 
re cove red f . o.b. mine pl ant price was $45. 75 per ton while liquid Frasch 
sold for $65. 00 a ton at the end of 1976. 
Texasg ul f ' s production level in 1976 was 2.5 million tons of sul phur 
contributed by the Fannett, Spindletop, Moss Bluff, and Newgulf (Boling} 
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mines in Texas , and the Bul ly Camp mine in Louisiana. In March of 1976 
Texasgulf s uspende d ope rations at Spindletop while opening a new mine at 
Comache Cree k in West Texas. This facility was projected to be a 400-600,000 
. ton produce r. Texas gul f also owned 34% of the Compania Exploradora de l 
Istmo in Mexi co, and fou r sour gas plants in Canada. Accompanying these 
s ulphur pro ducing ventures were their potash operations in Moab, Utah and 
All an, Saskatchewan (40% interest), and a natural soda ash plant in Granger, 
W . 152 yom1 ng. 
In 1977, U. S. sulphur demand exceeded output with industria l demand up 
10 pe rce nt. 153 The fer tilizer industry's consumption of sulphur was up 7 
pe rce nt, whil e U.S. production, exports, and producer's stocks all decl ined 
from 1976 l e ve l s . The Un ited States was still a net importer of sulph ur . 
The ave rage shipment val ue per long ton of Frasch, and recovered el emental 
sulphur f .o. b. mi ne/plant was $44.75 per ton in 1977 down 4% from 1976. 
Domestic • pro du cti on by all sources declined from 10.71 million tons in 1976 
to 10.53 mill ion ton s in 1977 a decrease of two percent. Recovered sul phur 
increased its share of t he market from 29% to 33% while Frasch production 
dropped to 56% f rom 59% . Shipments of all forms equalled 10. 79 mil l ion tons; 
a 5% increase over 1976. Imports were up 16% while exports decli ned by 
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thirteen percent. A 9% increase was seen in consumption, while stocks 
declined by 5% from 5.56 to 5.3 tons. Continued research was performed to 
recover sulphur from smelter gases, and industrial stack gases. The Bureau 
of Mines also continued its work in the exploration of new industrial 
applications of sulphur. These new applications included: 
ROADS - sulphur asphalt 
- sulphur concrete 
- sulphur impregnated concrete 
- foamed .sulphur 
BUILDINGS - sulphur concrete 
- sulphur impregnated concrete 
- ceramics 
- insulation 
foamed sulphur 
- sulphur coatings 
PACKAGING - sulphur impregnated cardboard 
- foamed sulphur 
- batteries 
In March 1979, Texasgulf closed its Frasch operation at Fannett Sulphur 
Mine (a 167,000 ton per year producer) in Jefferson County, Texas due to a 
scarcity of local natural gas, escalating productionccsts, and depleted 
reserves. Another contributing factor was Texasgulf's large volume of stocks 
which exceeded 4 million long tons. The Fannett Dome had propuced 3.5 
million long tons over its lifetime. 
The production capacities of the world producers of Frasch sulphur in 
1978 appeared as follows: 154 
93 
COUNTRY COMPANY APPROX. CAP. REMARKS 
U.S.A. Duval Corp. 3, 500,000 ltpa Rust ler Springs Frasch. 
Operation in Culberson 
County, W. Texas. Parent 
Company: Penzoil Co. 
Farmland 150,000 ltpa Frasch producer. Subsidiary 
of Atlantic Richfield Co. 
Mine at Fort Stockton (Texas ) 
Freeport Sulphur 3,000,000 ltpa Frasch producer! Operations 
at Ga rden Isle (La.) (1.5 m. 
ltpa.; off-shore); Caminada 
(La.) (off-shore, but closed 
in 1969 and put on standby 
basis ); Caill ou Island (La.) 
(projected, given right 
conditions ) . Grand Ecaille 
(La.) (0.3 m. ltpa) closing 
this year. 
Jefferson Lake 400,000 ltpa Frasch producer at Long Point 
Sulphur Co. (Texas ) {0.4 m. ltpa) 
Texasgulf Inc. 2,500,000 ltpa Frasch operations in Texas at 
Moss Bluff (0.3 m. ltpa); 
Newg ulf {1. 5 m ltpa); and 
Commache Creek {0.4 m. ltpa, 
opened Dec. 1975 ). Also Bully 
Camp , mine in La. 
Mexico Azufrera Pan- 1,500,000 ltpa Frasch mining at Jaltipan and 
american SA Veracruz 
Cia. Exploradoradel 1, 300,000 ltpa Texasg ulf Inc. subsi diary. 
Frasch sulphur at Coatza-
coal cos 
Poland State owned 5, 500,000 ltpa Frasch mines at Grzy row, 
Jeziorak, and Baznia; open-
pit Machow 
Iraq National Iraqi 1,000,000 ltpa Frasch type mine at Mishraq 
Minerals Co. in conjunction with Po land 
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Demand exceeded domestic output in 1978 with industrial demand up eight 
percent. 155 The fertilizer industry increa.sed its demand by five percent. 
Imports also exceeded exports. Frasch sulphur relinquished another five 
percent of production to the other forms of sulphur. Recovered sulphur was up 
3% from 33% to 36%, and all other forms contributed thi rteen percent. Price 
levels were $44.38 per ton mine f.o.b. and $67.42 per ton for li qui d at Tampa. 
January 1979 saw prices rising, and a shortage foreseen. Poland was now 
the number three producer of sulphur in the world followed by the U.S.S.R. 
The countries combined production was projected to rise by two million tons 
by 1980, but it still would not satisfy the demand of the communist countries. 
August 1979 saw an increased tightness in the industry. Prices continued 
their slow increase. Canadian sulphur sold for $55-60 per metri c ton f.o.b. 
Vancouver. Meanwhile, energy costs were hampering the American industry. 
The price at Tampa quoted by Freeport, Texasgulf, and Duval was $78 .25. 
In 1979, Freeport opened a new mine on a small depos it at cai ll,ou Island. 
Terrebonne Bay, Louisiana. Production was expected to begin in 1981. This 
small high cost deposit of limited reserves was being exploited to balance 
supply at the current level of sales. 156 The Lake Pelto plant was disassembled 
and moved down to Caillou Island for operation. 
The continued distressed market had begun to worsen in May. In November, 
Canadian Sulphur Export Corporation prepared delivery contracts enta iling a 
$60.00 per ton f.o.b. Vancouver pri ce. Liquid sulphur at Tampa was bei ng sold 
by the Americans for $73.25 per ton. 
The reason for the increased shortage was due to several contributing 
factors. A flood had parti ally closed operations at Poland's major open pit 
sulphur mine forcing a decline in production from 5.3 mi lli on tons to 4.8 
million tons. British Columbian l abor strikes had caused 100,000 tons of 
95 
sulphur to be trapped in shipment. The unrest in Iran caused the discontinu-
ation of its 500,000 ton per year su'Iphur production. An Iraqi contract was 
cancelled with Egypt for 100,000 tons per year. The continued demand of the 
fertilizer industry remained the main impetus beh ind the shortage with 
further expansion in the fertilizer market in North Africa, the Middle East, 
the East Corrmunist Bloc countries, and China. Freights also doubled,caus ing 
increases in the price of a ton of sulphur. All these factors co ntributed 
to the bullish nature of the market whi. ch continued to be advantageous to 
the sulphur producers. 
The extended strong demand caused France to open another recovery plant 
which produced 300,000 tons per year . Mexico also opened a 200,000 ton per 
1 t . 1979 N b · b · 157 year p an rn . ovem er pr1 ces were posted as eing: 
U.S. Frasch, liquid bright $95.50 Tampa. 
U.S. Frasch, liquid bright $110.00-115.00 c. i.f. European. 
French, Polish, liquid, c.i.f. North Europe $110.00-115 .00. 
Canadian solid slate, f~o.b. Vancouver spot sal e - $130 .00 
Canadian solid slate, f.o.b. Vancouver contract avg. $110.00-115.00. 
The United States finished the year as a net importer for the third straight 
year. Frasch sulphur contributed 52% to the market while recovered sulp hur 
contributed 36% and all others contribu ted fourteen percent. 158 
The shortage continued into 1980 with petro l eum companies seeking to 
recover more sulphur in refining operations. Meanwhile, Canada was vigorously 
11 remining 11 its stockpiles. In August 1980, U.S. Frasch liquid su lphur bright 
reached a posted price of $127.50 pe r ton. 
Freeport brought its Caillou Is l and mine, a 350,000 ton per year 
producer into production in December of 1980 two months ahead of schedule. 
The large power pl ant was mounted on a 200 foot 1 ong barge with a heating 
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capacity of 2.5 million gallons of water daily. The sulphur was loaded into 
2000 ton heated barges and transported to market in liquid form. 
A close balance between worldwide supply and demand was seen in 1980 
due to reduced European consumption. The reduced demand in Europe was 
attributed to recession, labor probl ems in Poland's shi pping industry and 
wars inthe Persi'1n Gulf. These factors combined with high U.S. demand and 
reduced refinery production of recovered sulphur caused stocks on the Gulf 
Coast and in other principal locations to be reduced. 
Freeport saw a third quarter reduction of 80,000 tons of stocks which 
continued into the fourth quarter. The company also recorded record earnings 
in the fourth quarter of 1980 which amounted to $38. 58 mi 11 ion compared to 
$25.99 million for the comparable quarter of 1979. Total earnings for the 
year were also at record levels equaling $147.40 million compared to $101.39 
million in 1979. Domestic oil and gas earnings provided most of the earnings 
while sulphur was the largest agricultural mineral group earner. 
The extremely strong sulphur market of 1980 brought profits up for 
Canadian companies as it had for Freeport. Aquitaine Company of Canada Ltd., 
a sour gas sulphur recoverer, recorded net earnings of $65 milli on (Canadian) 
which almost doubled their 1979 net earnings of $33 million. Their 1980 sales 
·volume was a record 1.2 milli on tonnes,an increase of 65% over 1979. 
Sales of Canadian sulphur were up 12% over those of 1979 with 7.136 
million tonnes of sales being posted. A large increase in the export price 
had increased sales revenues from $197.6 million in 1979 to $354.9 million 
in 1980. 
A one percent increase in the consumption of sulphur was observed in the 
U.S. in 1980 as 12.15 million tonnes were consumed. 159 Domestic production 
slipped by one percent at 10.37 million tonnes. Stocks of Frasch and 
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recovered sulphur were down 27% to 3.09 million tonnes from stocks present 
at the end of 1979. 
The 1980 source di stribution of production was 54% Frasch, 34% recovered 
elemental, and 12% all other forms. 16° Frasch sulphur had increased its s hare 
of the production by 2%. Total shipments for all forms of sulphur in both 
domestic and foreign markets were 12.7 million metric tons in 1980 down 4% 
from 13.29 million metric tons in 1979. Frasch sulphur represented 44% of 
the domestically consumed sul phur , and 13% of foreign consumption. 
In 1981, the major Frasch companies continued to diversify and expand . 
Freeport Minerals Company merged with the McMoRan Oil and Gas Company to form 
Freeport-McMoRan Incorporated. Freeport became the major stockholder by 
purchasing 81.5% of the new company ' s stock. The merger came about because 
of McM0Ran 1 s unexplored and undeveloped . oil and gas prospects, and the new 
company was expected to become a substantial competitor in the oi l and gas 
market. Freeport's oil and gas earnings accounted for 14% of their total 
revenue in 1979.161 
The continued strong sulphur market enabled the newly formed Freeport-
McMoRan company to record first quarter earnings of $48. 96 million versus 
$43.07 million forthe .same quarter in 1979. Production at their new Caillou 
Island facility had improved steadily while a new $2 million plant was 
started into operation in Culberson County, West Texas. The company also 
finished their expansion of their Freeport Kaolin plant which totaled $23 
mi 11 ion. 
Texasgulf expanded its Lee Creek phosrhate operation to a 850,000 tons 
per year capacity in 1981. The capacity was planned to be expanded to 1.02 
million tons per year in 1982. Among the $180 mi"llion in improvements will 
be a new sulphur terminal. The next expansion ofthefacility will be to a 
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capacity of two million tons of P2o5 a year. 
Total U.S. sulphur demand exceeded domestic production for the fourth 
straight year in 1981 even though industrial demand was down from 1980 figures 
by 4% while the fertilizer industry was down by 7%. The world market showed 
a similar character. 
U.S. production, imports and stocks all showed increases while consumption 
shipments, and exports declined. Stocks rose from 3.1 million tonnes in 1980 
to 3.4 mil lion tonnes in 1981. Thi s was also t he fifth year of U.S. net 
import reliance. 
Sulphur for domestic consumption came mainly from domestic sources: 
Frasch 37%, recovered 32%, and all other fonns (co- product sulphuric acid, 
pyrites, hydrogen sulohide. and sulphur dioxide) 12%. 162 The rema ining 19% 
was contributed b~ both Frasch and recovered sulphur imports. Eighty-fi ve 
percent of all the sulphur became sulphuri c acid before being used by other 
industries, and 60% of the sulphur was finally utilized by the ferti l izer 
industry. 
Freeport-McMoRan Inc. announced fourth quarter ea rnings of $26. 06 mill ion 
for 1981 compared to $40.87 milli on for the correspondi ng period of 1980. 
Full year ea rnings were reduced from $176.36 million in 1980 to $159.37mi llion in 
1981. 
One of the factors for the reduced earn ings of the fourth quarter was a 
30% fall in sulphur sales caused by a severe down-turn in the fann economy 
which began at mid-year, and because of depressed production and sa les in 
the phosphate fertilizer indust ry. 
Production, in 1982, is expected to be 12 million metric tons in the 
U.S. while consumption is expected to be 14 million tons . Frasch sulphur 
will probably contribute a litt l e l ess than 40% of the domestic supply whil e 
further importation of sulphur wi 11 amount to about 20% of the market. 
American Frasch will remain as a small percentage suppli er to the foreign 
market due to the highly competitive producers in Mexico, Canada, France, 
Poland, and Saudi Arabia. The war between Iraq and Iran will conti nue to 
disrupt this source of sulphur. 
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Saudi Arabia is a newcomer to the world sulphur market. Its sulphur i s 
produced by the recovery techniques applied to its large supplies of sour 
gas. The major plants are located at Berri, Uthmaniyal, and Shedgum. The 
building of operations began in 1979, and first deliveries began this year. 
This year's production i s e~pected to exceed 1 million tons. 
Texasgulf is one of three companies which will handle the exportation 
of the sulphur with their operation being the Berri site . Exports will be 
delivered to the Mediterranean , East Africa, and India. Total control will 
be turned over to the Saudi Sulphur Company, one of the present part ners, in 
1984 when they will be ready to handle the entire country' s facilities. 
India will be an especially favorable target for exportation since it was 
formerly completely dependent on Iraqian and Iranian su lphur. 
Meanwhile, the current recession is lowering consumption in industry. 
In response, the Frasch producers have stopped exploring for new sulphur 
deposits, and are satisfied to operate at a moderate level of production to 
keep a tight balance between supply and demand, and subsequently keep the 
price of sulphur high. The western producers are all utilizing th i s practice, 
and due to this practice more consumers are looking towa rds Eastern European 
producers and pyrite suppliers for their sulphur needs. 
The posted prices of sulphur as of May 1982 were: 163 
U. S. Frasch, liquid , bright, ex-terminal, Tampa $147.50 
U.S. Frasch liquid, bright, CIF N. Europe $160-$165 
French, Polish, liquid, CIF N. Europe $160-$185 
Canadian, solid/slate, FOB Vancouver, spot $110-$115 
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Canadian, solid/slate, FOB Vancouver, contract (average) $110-$115 
Frasch sulphur's position in the world market will continue to be 
infringed upon during thi s decade. There ~rill be continued expansion in 
sulphur recovery from sources and processes such as smelters and coal 
gasification. This segment of production will maintain its share of the 
market, but not increase it because of logistical and technical constraints 
k . . . d . 164 wor ing against its pro uction. However, further diversification in terms 
of the number of major exporting nations (e.g. Saudi Arabia) will take place 
with Eastern Europe and the Middle East becoming gradually more significant 
factors. They will provide both native and recovered elemental sulphur in 
amounts which should equalize the difference between consumption and the 
traditional sources of supply. 
Canada will be less of a strong factor in the market despite the 
exploitation of vast oil sands. A slow down in gas production will effect 
the Canadian production before the tarsand exploitation. The Canadians will 
continue to sell fromsulphur stocks long after gas production has diminished. 
Their export performance will be dependent on their ability to improve and 
enlarge their handling and transport facilities. The Canadians may be moving 
to the pellatization of their sulphur for easier handling. 
Combined sources such as pyrites will reassert part of their former 
performance, as long as no unexpected larger scale elemental sources are 
developed. In the meantime, the western world pyrite leaders, Spain, Portugal, 
and Italy will continue to sustain or increase the capacities of their 
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domestic industries. 
Anti-pollution sulphur will continue to increase in supply from its 2 
million tons in 1980 to 5 million tons in 1985. The 1990 estimate is 8 
million tons. This sulphur will continue to be sold on a small sca l e and in 
localized markets (e~g. California and the southwest ). The supply from this 
and other new sources of sulphur will surpass the demand for these same 
sources. 
The deman d for sulphur should ri se at a rate of 4.6% per year t hroug h 1990. 
Total world market consumption will rise at an estimated average rate of 5% 
according to these projected consumption figures: 165 
1982 - 55.99 million tons 
1984 - 59.07 million tons 
1986 - 61.89 million tons 
1988 ~ 64.83 million tons 
Frasch sulphur from the Uni ted States will probably dimini sh to contributing 
only 32% of the demanded sulphur in 1985. The reduction in the i nfluence of 
Frasch sulphur will be directly connected to the abundance of sulphur recovered 
from sour gas as this is the major competitive force in the market. Canada ' s 
ability to solve her transportation and handling problems will be a very 
important factor in the marketing of Frasch su lphur for once these problems 
are solved more Frasch markets will be invaded in the United States by the 
Canadian sulphur. 
The general economic condition of the United States will also be a 
major influence on the Frasch producers. Their tightly controll ed market 
will suffer if demand is not increased by an improved overall economy. 
Undoubtedly the trend will be for the Frasch companies to further diversify 
as Freeport did when it merged wi. th McMoRan in 1981. Qi 1 and gas, wi 11 be 
the most attractive areas of expansion. 
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The Frasch industry will be challenged by three problems which have 
been with the industry since its beginning. The first is the depletion of 
reserves. Every dome has a finite 1 imit to the amount of sulphur which may 
be extracted. The only an swer to this problem is to find new dome deposits. 
However, the uncertainty of the market, its bust to boom cycles, makes this 
exploration difficult. Th e cost of recovering sulphur fr6m new deposits 
will also be high because they wil l undoubtedly be offshore proj ects. That is 
the second problem. The l ast probl em is the ever increasing costs of energy 
to provide power to the pl ants . Herman Frasch encountered this problem with 
Alabama coal in the beginning of the. Union Sulphur Company. He was luckily 
saved by the plentiful oil soon found in Texas. Today, the Frasch producers 
must find ways of keeping the water ratio as low as possible as no new cheap 
energy sources are seen on the horizon. In the distant future, sma ll nuclear 
reactors would be one viabl e alternate energy source whi l e the location of 
the Frasch producers would make them exce 11 ent targets for solar powered 
steam production for heating the well and producing electricity. However, 
the near future will demand t he use of fossil fuels which the producers must 
use in the most efficient and conservative manner to remain an efficient 
producer of sulphur. 
SUMMARY 
Herman Frasch started t he Frasch sulphur industry in 1896 by utilizing 
his patented hot water mining process. The process pumped super-heated wat er 
down to the sulphur deposit enclosed in salt dome cap rock, melted the sulphur, 
and then pumped the molton s ulphur back to the surface. The original mine was 
located at Sulphur Mine., Louisiana in Calcasieu Parish (southwest Louisiana). 
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The Frasch industry expanded into one of few sellers, and remained 
geographically concentrated in east Texas, south Louisiana, and t he south -
east portion of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, Mexico. Herman Frasch's 
company, named the Union Sulphur Company, enjoyed a complete monopoly on 
the market from 1896 to 1912 due to Frasch's patents. Freeport Su lphur 
Company entered the industry with their operation at Bryanmound in east 
Texas in 1912. Texas Gul f Sulphur Company appeared in 1919 ~nth another 
east Texas operationat Big Hill. In 1925, Union Sulphur ended operations 
at Sulphur Mine due to the depletion of the dome's reserves. In 1928, 
Duva 1 Texas Sulphur Company entered the industry fo 11 owed by the Jefferson 
Lake Sulphur Company in 1932. These four sulphur companies have dominated 
the Frasch industry in the United States since 1932 with Texas Gulf and 
Freeport controlling nearly 90% of the market. Five other unsuccessful 
attempts to establi sh themselves as Frasch competitors were put forth by 
1) Baker Williams 1935, 2) Standard 1953- 1957, 3) Lone Star 1954, 4) Admiral 
1956, and 5) The United States Sulphur Company 1960-1962. 
Potentials that have been realized in the geograp hi cally concentrated 
industry have shown sulphur domes to be a scarce commodity as only 27 of 
200 Gulf coast salt domes have produced sulphur. Only ten of these 27 domes 
have produced five milli on tons of sulphur. Today only three domes, Garden 
Isle, Grand Isle, and Newgulf (Boling) produce a million or more tons of 
sulphur a year. 
The Frasch plant has grown more sophisticated since its inception at 
Sulphur Mine while the process itself has remained the same. Today operations 
are not only located onshore, but also offshore on platforms and f loating on 
barges. Seawater is used as well as freshwater in the mining process. 
Computerized instrumentat ion is utilized for complete and accurate control 
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of the mining facilities. The most important factor in a successful Frasch 
operation the water-ratio , gallons of water required to raise a ton of 
sulphur (usually from 1000 gallons to 12,000 gallons a ton), is lo~r~d as 
much as possi bl e by muddi ng programs to plug cavernous cap rock or bleed 
wells to drain off as much excess cold water which may be presen t in the 
cap rock as possible. The most important development in the industry in 
recent years was the ch ange over to liquid su lphur transport in 1959. This 
mode of transport is cl eaner, and more efficient than dry handling. It also 
changed the marketing t echniques of the Frasch producers, and the sulphur 
market balance in general. 
The Frasch industry has always been a direct seller of sulphur to its 
consumers, and is solely dependent on the demand of these consumers for the 
sales volume of their sul phur. The sale of sulphur has also been on a 
contract basis, and until 1959 sulphur prices were quoted as f.o.b. (free on 
board) mine or Gulf port . In 1959, the switch to liquid transport of sulphur 
caused prices to be quoted as delivery prices at regional terminals. 
Customer services provided by the producers to consumers were also increased 
when liquid transport was instituted, as were the length of contracts 
between producer and consumer due to the small stockpiling capacity of 
liquid t erminal s compared to the huge stockpiles of dry sulphur before 
1959. The sma -ller stockpiling caused the agreement to be lengthened 
because the same amount of supply was transported at a slower, but more 
constant rate. Frasch sulphur for export has for the majority of the 
industry's life, been marketed through the Sulphur Export Corporation 
(Sulexco). 
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The marketing of Frasch sulphur, and the power of the Frasch producers 
in the sulphur market have changed over the years. Union held a near 
monopoly over the domestic market from 1907-1915 while supplying a third 
of the foreign market with elemental sulphur in agreement with its only 
other canpetitor, Sici li an Sulphur. 
World War I brought increased demand for Frasch sulphur as the supply 
of Spanish pyrites was curtail ed to the American sulphuric acid industry. 
The price of sulphur was kept voluntarily low at this time of great demand 
to assist the munitions and fertili zer industries. This demand also caused 
an oversupply of sulphur stocks to develop when the Spanish supply was 
reestablished. The Frasch producers, to remain competitive, adjusted their 
prices to the price of domestic and imported pyrites over the next decade. 
This pattern of price adjustment to pyrites continued for the next twenty 
years. 
The American Frasch producers formed the Sulphur Export Corporation 
in 1922 to negotiate a world sulphur agreement with the Sicilian Consortium, 
the marketer of the Sicilian sulphur industry. Their negotiations formed a 
cartel which allocated 75% of the world market to the American Frasch 
producers and 25% to the Consortium. The two parties met periodically to 
fix prices, terms, and sal es conditions for their product. Thi s agreement 
lasted until 1932 when the Sicillian industry was nationalized. A similar 
agreement was then entered into by Sulexco and the nationalized industry in 
1934. 
The entry of Duval and Jefferson Lake had little effect on the posted 
price of sulphur whi.ch changed only once during the period of 1927 to 1946. 
Their entry did force the two big companies (Freeport and Texas Gulf, Union 
had depleted its reserves) to relinqui sh both foreign and domestic markets · 
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in order to retain a stabl e market price. The entry of Jefferson Lake 
also brought about campaigning for equitable taxation of Frasch sulphur 
production in Louisiana whi ch was successful in keeping the state's sulphur 
competitive in the domestic and world market. 
The industry remained stable through the depression due to cooperation 
between all the producers throughout the world. In 1939, Sulexco cancell ed 
all agreements with Italy due to war. The war again stimulated t he Frasch 
industry. Production rose while stockpi l es were reduced. 
A period of shortage began inmediately after the end of World War II 
as the chemical industry expanded rapidly and the Korean War demanded large 
amounts of sulphur dependent war products. Controls were pl aced on the 
industry to alleviate the shortage while new sources of elemental sulphur 
began to be developed. The first major new contributor of elemental sulphur 
was the Mexican Frasch industry whi ch undercut American prices at domestic 
ports, and forced the Americans to reduce their prices to remain competitive . 
The Mexican industry developed into an industry controlled by Mexican 
nationals, and profitable for both its Mexican and American investors. 
The recoverage of elemental s ul phur as a by-product from sour natural 
gas began in the 1950's and showed a marked effect on the industry in 1959 
when a period of surplus began in the sulphur market. Canada was the 
largest recoverer of by-product sulphur due to its large sour gas fields of 
Alberta, wh i1 e France became the second largest, and took over a considerable 
portion of the western European market. Canada became the worl d' s 1 eading 
exporter of sulphur due to their production of recovered sulphur. 
The Frasch producers began to diversify and expand during the 
1950's with prominent expansion into the Canadian recovered sulphur industry 
by Texas Gulf and Jefferson Lake. Jefferson Lake also expanded into 
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petrochemicals. Duval and Freeport expanded primarily into potash, 
metallic ores, phosphates, and kaolin. All of the Frasch producers entered 
the oil and gas market except for Duval. 
Sulexco was reestabli shed by all four Frasch producers in 1958 to 
irrprove Frasch sulphur's stance in the :·foreign market. However, Frasch 
sulphur lost 35% of its share of the market to competitors between 1960 and 
1963, and returns reached twenty-year lows on both the foreign and domestic 
markets. 
A period of shortage began in 1964 due to a rapid increase in both 
foreign and domestic demand 1 a rgely accounted to the ferti 1 izer industry. 
The Frasch reserves were low due to the sla ckened period of production 
between 1958 and 1963, and inadequate to meet the demand . Production was 
increased, but fell well behind demand for the period. Stocks were decreased 
significantly while prices were almost doubled, and shipments by U.S. Frasch 
producers were rationed to achieve a balance between supp ly and demand. The 
balance was finally achieved in 1968 due to increased world production 
especially in Canada, and due to a major decrease in consumption. 
A period of oversupply began in 1969 and continued through 1976. Canadian 
sulphur continued to enter the sulphur market in increasing amounts in 1970. 
The Canadian, French, Mexi can, and now Polish producers nearly eliminated the 
U.S. from foreign markets in 1970 by providing plentiful supplies of sulphur 
to easily and cheaply reached markets. The U.S . responded by closing down 
more facilities, and looking toward the federal government for protection from 
foreign dumping of sulphur in the domestic market. 
The international conference of sulphur producers in 1971 helped ease 
the sulphur conditions of the world market by agreeing on restraint of 
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output conditions, and a fixed floor price to be offered to consumers. This 
action came in another year of all time low prices. The Frasch industry was 
assisted by these measures~ and by legal rulings by the U.S. federal 
government which stopped both Mexican and Canadian dumping of sulphur on 
the U.S. domestic market. A strong fertilizer industry produced price 
increases by both American and Canadian producers in 1973. The fertilize r 
industry remained strong in 1974, but fell off in 1975 which caused an 
accumulation of stocks in the Frasch industry. The Frasch industry was also 
losing more of the domestic market which by 1976 had fallen to 59% compared 
to 69% in 1974. 
In 1977, increases in industrial consumption especially in the fertilizer 
industry broughtdemand above producti on in the United States. This increase 
continued into 1978 along with a slow rise in prices. In 1979, a shortage 
began to develop in the world market due to disruption in foreign supplies, 
and an expanding fertilizer market in developing countries. The shortage has 
continued into 1982 with a tight balance of trade being kept between supply 
and demand by the Frasch producers. 
The future of the Frasch industry will see more of its market being 
encroached upon by all fonns of sulphur, until it will hold only 32% of the 
market in 1985. Improved transportation systems in Canada could cause 
even more of the frasch domestic market to be lost by the end of the 
decade. Frasch sulphur will remain the producer's prime agricultural 
mineral corrmodity, while other mineral interests especially oil and gas 
will assume a much greater role in generating revenue for the Frasch 
producer. The industry faces three problems which have been present since 
its inception and will remai n the most influential in the future: 
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1) depletion ofexisting reserves, 2) high fuel costs for driving the power-
plant, and 3) market uncertainties that stifle exploration of new sources . 
Improved marketing strategies, customer service and technical advances in 
increasing the water ratios of the producing domes will be the only viable 
solutions to the challenges facing the Frasch industry in the years to come 
in order to keep it an efficient producer of sulphur. 
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